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CASENOTES
LABOR RELATIONS-State Legislated Agency Shop Clause Requir-
ing Payment of Service Charge by Nonunion Public Employees Is Valid
for Collective Bargaining Purposes but Compulsory Dues May Not Be
Used for Political Causes Opposed by Nonunion Members. Abood v.
Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
Agency and union shops' are congressionally and judicially sanc-
tioned 2 components of labor relations. Union shops, which require union
membership of every employee, are firmly established vehicles for col-
lective bargaining and representation. 3 Agency shop agreements, accept-
ed as permissible variants of union shops,4 do not require union member-
ship, but do compel employees to pay a service charge to help defray the
union's collective bargaining expenses.5 Absent conflicting federal regu-
lation, individual states may enact legislation either requiring or barring
1. Agency shop agreements generally require nonunion employees to pay a service
charge equivalent to the union initiation fee plus periodic installments equivalent to the
union dues. Union membership, however, is not required. See Meade Elec. Co. v.
Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959). Union shop agreements provide that
no one will be employed who does not join the union within a short time after being hired.
2. See Labor Management Relations Act, § 8(a), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1970), which
provides in pertinent part: "[N]othing in this subchapter, or in any other statute of the
United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization. . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after
the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment ....... See NLRB v.
General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, (1%3), in which the Court noted that -[a]s far as the
federal law [is] concerned, all employees [can] be required to pay their way ....... 373
U.S. at 741.
3. The membership requirement is sufficiently satisfied by payment of dues. Active
participation in union activities is not required. See 93 CONG. REC. 4887 (1947) (comments
of Senator Taft); NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 741-43 (1963) (29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) is applicable to agency shop provisions); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347
U.S. 17, 41 (1953). Cf. NLRB v. Milk Drivers, 531 F.2d 1162 (2d Cir. 1976) (inactive
member entitled to earn livelihood); NLRB v. Aclang, 466 F.2d 558, 562 (5th Cir. 1972)
(interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) as requiring management not to encourage or discour-
age effective union membership). See generally Fraser & Johnston Co. v. NLRB, 469 F.2d
1259 (9th Cir. 1972).
4. See NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
5. As exclusive bargaining representative, the union must "fairly and equitably ...
represent all employees . . . union and nonunion" within the unit. International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 761 (1961). Accord, Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 564 (1976); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 (1967); Humphrey v.
Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964); Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953);
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agency or union shop membership as a condition of employment. 6 With
the growth of agency and union shops, however, nonunion employees
have challenged the expenditure of their compulsory dues to finance
political and ideological causes with which they disagree. Specifically,
they have alleged that the compulsory financial support of unions in-
fringes upon their first amendment rights.
To protect nonunion members' constitutional freedoms, the Supreme
Court has ruled that agency shop assessments required of nonunion
members cannot be used for political purposes which those employees
oppose. 7 The Court has, nevertheless, maintained that collective bar-
gaining agreements which condition employment on agency or union
shop membership do not, on their face, impinge upon constitutionally
protected rights of association. 8 Recently, in Abood v. Detroit Board of
Education,9 the Supreme Court extended the constitutionality of agency
shop clauses to the public employment sector,' 0 holding that public
employees may be compelled to pay union service charges for legitimate
collective bargaining" activities. The Court added, however, that it
would be impermissible for the unions to use these funds for political
causes to which nonunion employees objected. 2
Steele v. Louisville & N.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192,202-03 (1944). Seealso Emporium Capwell
Co. v. Western Addition Community Organization, 420 U.S. 50, 64 (1975); NLRB v. Allis-
Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
6. 29 U.S.C. § 164(b) provides in pertinent part, "Nothing in this subchapter shall be
construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring membership
in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State . . . in which such
execution or application is prohibited by State . . . law." See Retail Clerks v. Scher-
merhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963) (section 164(8) encompasses both agency shop and union
shop agreements).
Statutes prohibiting labor organization membership as a condition of employment are
commonly known as right-to-work laws. It has been judicially determined that notwith-
standing state enacted right-to-work laws, federally enacted legislation sanctioning union
and agency shop agreements will prevail. Brotherhood of Ry. & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373
U.S. 113 (1963); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). See note 33
& accompanying text infra. Cf. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 750-64 (1961) (determining that stabilizing labor relations in the nation's railroad
industry was a more important concern in enactment of the Railway Labor Act than
possible first amendment loss).
7. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963); International
Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway Employees' Dep't v. Hanson,
351 U.S. 225 (1956).
8. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists, 367 U.S. at 749.
9. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
10. Id. at 234.
11. One commentator defines collective bargaining as a process of establishing terms
and conditions of employment in a written agreement negotiated between the public
employer and a union acting as exclusive representative of the employee in the bargaining
unit. Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective, 83 YALE L.J. 1156
n.1 (1974).
12. 431 U.S at 235. The growth of public sector unions and their consequential power
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D. Louis Abood challenged the validity of an agency shop clause,
which required that he pay a teachers' union 3 a service charge equiva-
lent to the regular dues of the union members, alleging that a substantial
part of the charge would be expended for political and ideological pro-
grams which he opposed. 14 Granting the defendants' motion for sum-
mary judgment, the trial court held such clauses constitutional, 5 thus
barring Abood's claim. The Michigan Court of Appeals upheld the trial
court's determination of constitutionality, 6 and the Supreme Court of
in influencing governmental decisions is comprehensively discussed in Project: Collective
Bargaining and Politics in Public Employment, 19 U.C.L.A.L. REV. 887, 893-920, 1011-19
(1972).
Abood also touches on the problem of establishing appropriate fund arrangements by
limiting union expenditure of compulsory dues. Suggested solutions include either grant-
ing a rebate of that proportion of the protestant's dues spent on causes adverse to him or,
alternatively, enjoining expenditure by the union of the proper percentage of the nonunion
members dues which would be used for political causes. See Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks
v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 120-22 (1963); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 774-75 (1961). Discussion of the various remedies suggested by the Court is beyond
the scope of this article. It is worth noting, however, that in Abood the Supreme Court
mentioned the possible appropriateness of deferring further judicial proceedings on this
issue since it seemed that an internal union remedy might prove adequate in this case. 431
U.S. at 242.
13. Defendants were the Detroit Federation of Teachers and the Detroit Board of
Education. They had concluded a collective bargaining agreement effective from July 1,
1969 to July 1, 1971, containing provisions for an agency shop. Id. at 211-12.
14. The action was a consolidation of two similar suits, Warczak v. Detroit Bd. of
Educ., 73 L.R.R.M. 2237 (Cir. Ct. Wayne County 1970) and Smigel v. Southgate Commu-
nity School Dist., 388 Mich. 531, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1972). Warczak was a class action
brought on the same grounds as Abood two months before the agency shop clause was to
become effective. The Wayne County Circuit Court dismissed Warczak for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted, 73 L.R.R.M. 2237 (Cir. Ct. Wayne
County 1970), and the plaintiffs appealed. While this appeal was pending, the Michigan
Supreme Court ruled in Smigel that state law prohibited public sector agency shops. 338
Mich: 531, 202 N.W.2d 305 (1970). Accordingly, Warczak was vacated and remanded. On
remand Warczak was consolidated with Abood. 431 U.S. at 213-14.
15. See 60 Mich. App. 92, 97, 230 N.W.2d 322, 327. The trial court noted that
subsequent to the inception of Abood's action, Michigan had statutorily authorized
agency shops in the public sector. In 1973, following Smigel, the state leglislature enacted
1973 Mich. Pub. Acts, No. 25, MIcH. COMp. LAWS § 423.210(l)(c) as an amendment to its
Public Employment Relations Act. The section provides in part, "Nothing in this act or in
any law of this state shall preclude a public employer from making an agreement with an
exclusive bargaining representative . . . to require as a condition of employment that all
employees in the bargaining unit pay . . . a service fee .... ." The court declared the
statute to be retroactive. 60 Mich. App. at 96, 230 N.W.2d at 325.
16. The court reversed, however, on the issue of retroactive application. Id. at 102, 230
N.W.2d at 327. In addition, the appellate court noted that Michigan law permitted union
expenditures for lobbying and political support. Consequently, the court recognized that
had the teachers alerted the union to their objections, subsequent expenditure by the
union of those employees' dues, notwithstanding their protest, could have been regarded
as a violation of the teachers' first amendment rights. Because the union had not been
notified of the teachers' objections, the court remanded, denying the requested injunction
[Vol. 27:132
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Michigan denied review. Abood then turned to the United States Su-
preme Court which noted probable jurisdiction. 17
On this appeal 18 the Court upheld the validity of agency shop agree-
ments for public employees 9 but ruled that a state cannot constitutional-
ly compel public employees to contribute to union political activities
which they consider objectionable. 20 Accordingly, the decision of the
appellate court was vacated and the case remanded to determine whether
specific union activities were outside the scope of collective bargaining
and should thus be termed "political". 2' Justice Powell, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, concurred but asserted that since
public-sector collective bargaining was political in nature and state
adopted union shop agreements could be likened to "coercive govern-
ment regulation," the constitutional rights of the employees required a
substantial protection which the Court had declined to afford them.
22
Justice Rehnquist supported Justice Powell's reasoning, arguing that he
which would have barred the union from collecting any service charge from nonunion
members. Id. The Supreme Court noted that since the appellate court's judgment on the
retroactivity issue did not undermine the trial court's holding, the purpose of its remand
was unclear. 431 U.S. at 216 n.8.
17. 425 U.S. 949 (1976). The Supreme Court accepted the appeal, although neither the
1971 agreement containing the challenged agency shop clause nor a subsequent 1973
agreement containing substantially the same provision was operative. The Court reasoned
that the portion of the plaintiffs' claim challenging the constitutionality of compulsory
service charges survived despite expiration of the agreements, since some of the plaintiffs
in both Warczak and Abood either refused to pay the charge or paid under protest. 431
U.S. at 216-17 n.9.
18. The Supreme Court considered whether an agency shop arrangement in the public
sector "violates the constitutional rights of governmentemployees who object to public-
sector unions as such or to various union activities financed by the compulsory service
fees." Id. at 211. The Court distinguished between the agency shop provision at issue in
Abood and a union shop agreement which required membership. It declined to address the
validity of a union shop agreement in the public sector since no such agreement was under
consideration. Id. at 217 n.10.
19. Id. at 234.
20. Id. at 235. The Court unanimously held that compulsory financial support for union
political activities was unconstitutional, because such compelled support would violate
the teacher's first and fourteenth amendment rights. The first amendment guarantees
freedom from congressional interference with an individual's right to associate. Similarly,
the fourteenth amendment guarantees protection from state infringement of association.
21. Since Abood reached the Supreme Court on the pleadings, the Court could not
determine whether the teachers' rights had been impugned. The record contained only
general allegations without evidentiary proof of specific political union activities. Id. at
236-37.
22. Id. at 254-55. Justice Powell felt that Abood should be distinguished from prior
decisions since the state, not private industry, had negotiated and adopted its own agency
shop agreement. Consequently, he concluded that the agreement should be subjected
"like any other enactment of state law . . . to the constraints that the Constitution
imposes on coercive governmental regulation." Id. at 253 (footnote omitted). See also
cases cited note 58 infra.
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could find no distinction between compelling political party membership
as a condition of employment and requiring public employee contribu-
tion to union collective bargaining costs.2 3 And finally, in a third concurr-
ence, Justice Stevens noted that because the case had reached the Court
on the pleadings, the majority opinion was not determinative of the
appropriate remedy to ensure nonideological expenditures of union as-
sessments from nonunion employees.24
I. AGENCY SHOP CONSTITUTIONALITY AND FIRST AMENDMENT
RIGHTS-Two CONFLICTING PRINCIPLES
The necessity for union service fee agreements was recognized by
Congress in 1947 when it enacted the Labor Management Relations
Act. 25 Aware that serious abuses of compulsory unionism had aroused
public support for elimination of the closed shop, 26 Congress neverthe-
less determined that union bargaining activities involved substantial ex-
pense which nonunion members should justifiably help defray. Without
union security provisions, many employees who shared the benefits of
union negotiating efforts would refuse to share the costs.2 7 Congress
concluded, therefore, that union shop agreements were an acceptable
method of eliminating "free riders" 28 and at the same time securing
financial assistance for a union's bargaining efforts. In addition, the
lawmakers saw the agreements as promoting labor stability by eliminat-
ing conflicting and confusing employee demands.29 Since congressional-
23. 431 U.S. at 243-44.
24. Id. at 244.
25. 61 Stat. 136. See note 2 supra.
26. S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 6 (1947). Closed shop agreements provide
that employers will hire only union members. 29 U.S.C. § 158(aX3) provides in pertinent
part, "[lit shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ...by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage. . . membership in any labor organization." See also H.R. REP. No. 245, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. 33 (1947) which states that "[tihe bill prohibits what is commonly known
as the closed shop ...... and S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 6-7 (1947) which
states, "It is clear that the closed shop which requires preexisting union membership as a
condition of obtaining employment creates too great a barrier to free employment to be
longer tolerated."
27. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 607 (1947); H.R. CONF. REP. No. 105,
80th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1947).
28. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1947). "[T]hese amendments remedy
the most serious abuses of compulsory union membership and yet. . .[promote] stability
by eliminating [free riders]. Free riders are nonunion employees who pay none of the
union's collective bargaining expenses but still receive any benefits resulting from union
negotiations. See also comment of Congressman Madden, 93 CONG. REC. 3441 (1947).
29. See S. REP. No. 105, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 7 (1947). See generally 93 CONG. REC.
4194 (1947). "[T]he pending bill retains ... the power of collective bargaining. . . and if
[the employees] can get a majority [to select their representative] all the other employees
[Vol. 27:132
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ly permissible union shop agreements would prohibit employee discharge
from union membership for any reason other than failure to pay dues and
assessments, the abuses associated with compulsory unionism would be
eliminated. 3° Consequently, the Act contains language permitting union
shops under federal law. 3
Judicial opinion regarding the validity of union shop membership has
reflected congressional reasoning. In one of the earliest such judicial
expressions, Railway Employees' Department v. Hanson ,32 the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a union shop provision, notwith-
standing a state right-to-work law which barred union affiliation as a
condition of employment.33 In sustaining the agreement entered into
have to keep quiet and permit the representatives of the majority to bargain for all of
them."I.
30. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 4193-94 (1947) (remarks of Sen. Taft). Congress did not
want unions to have indiscriminate power to have employees fired:
So, also, if a union fires a man for some reason other than nonpayment of dues,
if the employee is willing to pay his dues to the union, then the union cannot
compel the employer to fire him because he is no longer a member of the union,
through some action of the union in expelling him. That seems to be only common
sense and common justice.
The pending measure does not propose any limitation with respect to the
internal affairs of unions. They still will be able to fire any members they wish to
fire, and they still will be able to try any of their members. All that they will not be
able to do, after the enactment of this bill, is this: If they fire a member for some
reason other than nonpayment of dues they cannot make his employer discharge
him from his job and throw him out of work. That is the only result of the
provision under discussion.
• . * We intend to retain all the benefits of the labor legislation which has been
enacted since the twenties, but in the bill we correct injustice after injustice
which has developed in the administration of labor laws.
Id.
31. See note 2 supra.
32. 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
33. Id. at 238. Article XV, § 13 of the Nebraska Constitution, as implemented by NEB.
REV. STAT. § 48-217 (1947), prohibited both closed shops and denial of employment due to
lack of union affiliation. Union shop agreements were authorized however by the Railway
Labor Act, § 2, Eleventh, 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1951), which provides that any carrier may
agree to a union shop which requires payment of dues or initiation fees as a condition of
employment, notwithstanding state law to the contrary. The Railway Labor Act, unlike
the Labor Management Relations Act does not have the equivalent of the latter's § 164(b).
See note 6 supra. Rather, the Railway Labor Act is a preemptive federal statute which
leaves no room for states to limit unions through right-to-work legislation.
The Court studied the history of union shop provisions and concluded that notwith-
standing any state law, the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and
judicial determination had established that federal regulation of interstate industry took
precedence over state law. 351 U.S. at 232. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937).
1977]
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between an interstate railroad and its employees' union,34 the Court
denied that first amendment rights were being violated. It asserted that
since the evidence indicated only that compulsory assessments from
nonunion members had been used for collective bargaining purposes on
behalf of all employees, the provision therefore infringed no first amend-
ment rights. 35 The Court did state, however, that if assessments were
used to force ideological conformity with union goals, rather than to
promote collective bargaining, first amendment considerations would be
involved, 36 and it noted that Hanson would not prejudice any future
decision regarding the constitutionality of union political expenditures.37
International Association of Machinists v. Street38 provided the Court
with an opportunity to address the precise issue suggested, but left
unresolved, in Hanson.39 In Street, railroad machinists sought to enjoin
enforcement of a union shop agreement requiring them to join a union
and pay initiation fees and periodic dues to retain their jobs. The employ-
ees argued that the fees were being used to support political causes with
which they disagreed, thus violating their first amendment right of free
association. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court avoided confronting the
first amendment question. 40 Rather, the majority turned to the Railway
34. 351 U.S. at 235. Congressional rationale for authorization of union shop agree-
ments under the Railway Labor Act closely parallels the rationale used for enactment of
the Labor Management Relations Act. Union shop provisions were held valid under both
acts to discourage free riders. See H.R. REP. No. 2811, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1950).
35. 351 U.S. at 233-38. Absent contrary evidence that the funds were either used as a
cover to force ideological conformity or that the union attempted to enforce any other
reprehensible condition of employment, the Court felt no need to address the first
amendment issue. "We only hold that the requirement for financial support of the
collective-bargaining agency by all who receive the benefits of its work . . . does not
violate . . . the First . [Amendment]." Id. at 238.
36. Id. at 235, 238.
37. Id. at 238.
38. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
39. The evidence clearly indicated that a substantial part of the compelled funds were
used to finance campaigns of federal and state officials the employees opposed and to
promote the propagation of ideologies and concepts with which they disagreed. Id. at 744.
The Georgia trial court, therefore, entered an injunction against enforcement of the union
shop agreement holding that it violated the employees' first amendment rights. The
Georgia Supreme Court affirmed, 215 Ga. 27, 108 S.E.2d 796 (1959), ruling that § 2,
Eleventh of the Railway Labor Act was unconstitutional since it permitted an "unwarrant-
ed" invasion of freedom of association and political freedom. See International Ass'n of
Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 745 n.3.
The United States Supreme Court was asked to address the constitutionality of the
union shop provision under which part of the exacted funds would be used to support
political and economic programs nonunion employees opposed, but declined to do so. See
note 43 & text accompanying notes 41-44 infra.
40. In Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 829 (1961) (plurality opinion), decided the
same day as Street, the Supreme Court avoided deciding a similar question, ruling that
[Vol. 27:132
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Labor Act4' for the source of its decision, reasoning that the Act was
intended to alleviate the financial burdens suffered by unions in their
collective bargaining and grievance adjustment efforts42 and that it pro-
hibited political expenditures from compulsory union dues. 43 The con-
stitutional issue thus avoided, the Court reaffirmed its holding in Hanson
validating union security arrangements for collective bargaining pur-
poses. 44
Although the Hanson and Street Courts specifically upheld union
shops, 45 agency shops46 have similarly received judicial approval. In
NLRB v. General Motors Corp.47 the Court accepted agency shop ar-
because expenditures by the Wisconsin State Bar Association could not be classified as
purely political, a clause requiring all practicing attorneys to pay annual $15.00 dues was
valid. The Court affirmed the Wisconsin Supreme Court, see 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N.W.2d
404 (1960), without passing on its conclusion that an attorney could be constitutionally
compelled to support political activities he opposed. 367 U.S. at 847-48. The Supreme
Court specifically reserved that issue, since the record did not indicate the proportion of
funds allegedly spent on political causes. d.
41. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1970). See note 34 supra.
42. 367 U.S. at 763-74, 768.
43. The Court acknowledged that in Street, unlike Hanson, there was a showing of
political expenditure, 367 U.S. at 748, but after an examination of the legislative history of
the Railway Labor Act, the Court concluded that Congress did not intend to provide
"unions with a means for forcing employees, over their objection, to support political
causes which they oppose" by enacting § 2, Eleventh. d. at 764, 768. See also Brother-
hood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113 (1963). Rather, upon reviewing the Act's
legislative history, the majority concluded that the constitutional issue could be avoided
by construing the purpose of the statute. 367 U.S. at 749-50.
44. Id. The Street majority opinion provoked a strong dissent from Justices Black,
Frankfurter, and Harlan. Justice Black asserted that the Court had rewritten the Railway
Labor Act instead of interpreting it and chided the Court for avoiding the obvious
constitutional issue. Id. at 784-86 (Black, J., dissenting). He argued that the Act as
correctly interpreted, abridged first amendment rights by compelling political support
from unwilling employees, commenting "[Wihether there is such abridgment depends not
only on how the law is written, but also on how it works." Id. at 789 (Black, J.,
dissenting). Justice Black cited the Act's legislative history to indicate that the legislation
did not limit union expenditure to collective bargaining. Id. at 784-785 n.8 citing Hearings
on S. 3295, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 136-37 (1950); Hearings on H.R. 7789 Before the House
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 160 (1951); 104 CONG.
REC. 11214-24, 11330-47 (1958); 96 CONG. REC. 1749-50 (1951).
In a second dissent, Justice Frankfurter, joined by Justice Harlan, stated that the
legislative history of the Act demonstrated that Congress, fully cognizant of union politic-
al activities, was not concerned with limiting such activity. 367 U.S. at 800-02 citing 96
CONG. REC. 17049-50, Hearings on S. 3295 Before the Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on
Labor and Public Welfare, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 173-74 (1951). Justice Frankfurter said,
"[flor us to hold that these defendant unions may not expend their moneys for political
and legislative purposes would be completely to ignore the long history of union conduct
and its pervasive acceptance in our political life .... 367 U.S. at 812-14 (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
45. See note I supra (union shops).
46. Id. (agency shops).
47. 373 U.S. 734 (1963).
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rangements as viable alternatives to the union security provisions it had
sustained in the railroad union cases." General Motors had refused to
negotiate for an agency shop provision, alleging that Indiana law pro-
hibited conditioning employment on union membership. 9 The Supreme
Court, however, reasoned that since the single membership requirement
of the provision was payment of union initiation fees and dues and that
since active union membership, available on a nondiscriminatory basis,
was optional with each employee, the proposed agreement conformed to
the membership standard defined by Congress.5 0 The Court concluded
that the membership requirement of the proposed agency shop substan-
tially differed from union membership barred by Indiana law and upheld
its validity.5 1
Although it had upheld union security agreements in private industry,
the Court was aware that employees' associational rights could be in-
fringed if unions were to use compulsory dues for political purposes
which nonmembers find objectionable. Notwithstanding the Court's
hesitation in Hanson and Street to acknowledge union political involve-
ment in areas unrelated to collective bargaining,5 2 those decisions evi-
dence the Court's desire to safeguard first amendment political rights for
private employees.5 3 Consequently, permissible compulsory union mem-
bership in private enterprise has been "whittled down to its financial
core" to the extent necessary to promote improved labor relations. 4 The
Court determined that this minimal membership requirement sufficiently
protected constitutional rights of privately employed individuals.
The Court has been equally protective of public employees' constitu-
tional guarantees. 5 Established legal principle holds that absent a com-
48. See also Retail Clerks Int'l Ass'n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746 (1963).
49. In Meade Elec. Co. v. Hagberg, 129 Ind. App. 631, 159 N.E.2d 408 (1959), the
Indiana intermediate appellate court had ruled that an agency shop arrangement which
compelled payment of union dues and initiation fees did not violate Indiana's right-to-
work law. The proposed agreement in General Motors, 373 U.S. at 736, was similar to that
sustained in Meade, 159 N.E.2d at 409-10.
50. See 373 U.S. at 743; note 3 supra.
51. 373 U.S. at 745.
52. See notes 35 & 43 supra. See also Brotherhood of Ry. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S.
113 (1963).
53. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra. See also International Ass'n of Machin-
ists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 764 (1961).
54. NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 742 (1963).
55. See, e.g., City of Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations
Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167 (1976). The Court upheld the right of a nonunion teacher to oppose
a proposed "fair share" clause at an open Board of Education meeting, although the
clause which required payment of union dues by union and nonunion teachers was
considered a proper subject for collective bargaining. Id. at 177. The Court reasoned that
the teacher was not only an employee, but also a concerned citizen whose opinion could
not be strictly construed as "bargaining." Id. at 175-77.
[Vol. 27:132
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pelling state interest, public employment cannot be conditioned on the
surrender of first amendment rights. 56 Most recently, in Elrod v.
Burns ,57 the Court ratified prior decisions which determined that public
employment cannot be conditioned upon an employee's political be-
liefs. 58 The Elrod plaintiffs, who had lost their jobs because they were
neither affiliated with nor sponsored by the incumbent political party,
59
56. See cases cited note 58 infra. Cf. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973)
(upholding the § 818 of Oklahoma's Merit System of Personnel Administration Act, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 74 (1959) patterned upon Hatch Act provisions); United States Civil
Service Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S 548 (1973) (upholding
Hatch Act provision prohibiting federal employees from taking active part in political
management). It is well settled that a compelling state interest is required for any state
abridgement of first amendment rights. See Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (state
cannot interfere with selection of delegates to national party convention); Kramer v.
Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (franchise limitation based on property
holdings in school district elections not necessary to promote compelling state interest);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (Virginia statute prohibiting NAACP to assist its
members to find legal counsel unconstitutional); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson,
357 U.S. 449 (1958) (no compelling state interest to justify disclosure of NAACP member-
ship lists).
57. 427 U.S. 347 (1976).
58. See, e.g., U.S. v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 263 (1967) (federal statute barring Commu-
nist supporter from defense plant job unconstitutional since it insinuated guilt of anti-
Americanism by association alone); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)
(New York statutes barring employment on the basis of membership in subversive
organizations invalid); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (Arkansas statute compel-
ling public school teachers to disclose organization membership as condition of employ-
ment infringed first amendment rights). Cf. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972)
(rejecting the proposition that tenure "expectancy" was only available to teachers who
surrender first amendment rights); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968)
(unconstitutional to fire teacher for speaking on matter of public interest regarding school
funds); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (lack of religious belief cannot preclude
granting of notary commission).
Political belief and association have also been well protected by the first amendment.
See, e.g., Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (state may not compel exhibition of an
ideological message on automobile license plate); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973)
(voter cannot be locked into political party by restrictive state primary election law); West
Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (flag salute not required in public
schools). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (limiting campaign contributions
violates freedom of speech and association); California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21 (1974) (premature charge of first amendment violation if disclosure of association's
membership not sought); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960) (municipal ordinances
requiring disclosure of NAACP membership lists encroach on freedom of association);
NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (compelled disclosure of membership in dissi-
dent organization violates freedom of association); United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41
(1953) (Congress has limited power under the first amendment to grant committee power
to investigate lobbying).
59. Cook County tradition dictated that when a newly elected sheriff assumed office he
would replace noncivil service employees on his staff with loyal party members. A
recently elected Democratic sheriff replaced three of the petitioners who were Republican
noncivil service employees because of their political preference. A fourth employee was
threatened with imminent discharge.
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sought to enjoin local patronage practices. Affirming the Seventh Cir-
cuit's order for injunctive relief,6° the Supreme Court ruled it unconstitu-
tional to discharge employees for their political preferences alone. 6' The
Court suggested that such patronage practices threatened to eliminate
political opposition essential to the democratic process by allowing cer-
tain employees to be discharged solely because their political belief
might cause them to express opposition to their superior's actions.
62
Thus under a patronage system, public employees could be removed
from their jobs to prevent them from exercising their constitutionally
protected rights of belief and association. Because public employees had
neither the time nor the finances to advance both individual political
causes and those required for employment, the Court determined that
forced financial party support and forced party allegiance restrain free-
dom of belief and association. 63 Therefore, the Court concluded that
"political belief and association [which] constitute the core of those
activities protected by the First Amendment" 64 were not proper condi-
tions of public employment. 65
The Court has consistently held that the Constitution guarantees asso-
ciation with the political party of one's choice and bars any government
official from attempting to influence that choice.' Elrod reflects judicial
insistence on political associational freedom. The Hanson and Street
decisions, which upheld private enterprise compulsory agency shop as-
sociation for bargaining purposes, suggest a similar judicial desire to
protect employees' political rights.67 Although the Elrod Court specific-
60. 427 U.S. 347, 350 (1976). The trial court had denied the injunction, ruling that
failure of the employees to show irreparable injury necessitated a finding that they had
failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Seventh Circuit reversed
and remanded, instructing the district court to enter injunctive relief. 509 F.2d 1133 (7th
Cir. 1975). Certiorari was granted by the Supreme Court, 423 U.S. 821 (1976), which then
affirmed the appellate court.
61. See 427 U.S. 347, 357-73 (1976).
62. Id. at 359 n.13, 369-70. Pertinent to its analysis was the determination that "a
democratic system . . . [indispensably depends] on the unfettered judgment of each
citizen on matters of political concern." Id. at 372. The Court required "only that the
rights of every citizen to believe as he will and to act and associate according to his beliefs
be free to continue. Id.
63. Id. at 355-56.
64. Id. at 356 (footnote omitted).
65. See id. at 357. The court suggested, however, that patronage dismissals for those in
policy making positions might be permissible in order to guarantee unobstructed im-
plementation of new administration policies. Id. at 367.
66. See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976) citing West Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943). "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in
politics .... ." See also cases cited note 58 supra.
67. See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra. See also International Ass'n of Machin-
ists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 764 (1961).
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ally addressed the issue of state patronage practices, the Court recog-
nized that as government employment becomes increasingly pervasive,
its power to "starve political opposition" increases. 68 The Court's rea-
soning compelled its determination that forcing financial partisan sup-
port threatens our democratic system of government.69 Its unbridled
endorsement of agency shops which compel financial membership does
not ostensibly conflict with its acknowledgment that requiring political
financial support can strangle freedom of political association. Such
conflict should result only from a finding that agency shop negotiating
activities were political. But collective bargaining in the public sector,
unlike that in private industry, is political. 70 Therefore, in order to justify
agency shop provisions in the public sector, the Court would have to
reconcile the conflict between its sanction of union security agreements
for collective bargaining purposes and its insistence upon free political
association. Abood presented the Court with the opportunity to weigh its
stance concerning government employees' constitutional rights against
its contention that permitting agency shop agreements for collective
bargaining purposes does not curtail nonunion members' first amend-
ment protections. 71 Its validation of public sector agency shops, howev-
er, represents a denial of mutually exclusive principles.
II. ABOOD--A POLITICALLY EVASIVE DECISION
The Court's decision in Abood rested on two premises-that judicial
precedent urged validation of the public sector agency shop72 and that
government employees do not significantly differ from their private
counterparts. 73 The majority reasoned that government interests advanc-
ed by the Michigan provision were similar to those promoted by federal
labor law and affirmed in Hanson and Street. In those cases, promotion
of labor stability by eliminating discordant bargaining demands and free
riders had been held to justify imposition of union shop membership
under the Railway Labor Act. 74 Similarly, the Abood Court, anticipating
68. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356 (1976).
69. Id. See id. at 368-69.
70. See, e.g., Project, supra note 12; text accompanying notes 93-102 infra.
71. The constitutional issue avoided in Hanson and Street was made pertinent in
Abood by the ruling of the Michigan Court of Appeals that state law sanctioned "the use
of nonunion members' fees for purposes other than collective bargaining." 60 Mich. App.
at 99, 230 N.W.2d at 326. See note 16 supra.
72. "[I]nsofar as the service charge is used to finance expenditures by the Union for
the purposes of collective bargaining, contract administration, and grievance adjustment,
[the Hanson and Street] decisions of this Court appear to require validation of the agency-
shop agreement before us." 431 U.S. at 225-26. See text accompanying notes 74-75 infra.
73. 431 U.S. at 229-30. See text accompanying note 76 infra.
74. See text accompanying notes 33 & 42 supra. See also Oil, Chemical & Atomic
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probable conflict and confusion at the bargaining table in the absence of
cohesiveness, recognized the need for agency shops in the public sector,
concluding that "[tIhe desirability of labor peace is no less important
[there] nor . . . the risk of 'free riders' any smaller."75
After determining the need for public sector agency agreements, the
majority found that public and private employees possessed common
needs and skills, as well as a desire for the advantages of collective
bargaining. Consequently, they found no distinction between public and
private employees, other than the nature of their employer, 76 and con-
cluded that this difference alone did not give public employees "weigh-
tier First Amendment interest[s]" than their private counterparts. 77
Thus, the majority considered appropriate the Hanson-Street rationale
that union shop contribution to labor relations outweighed the possibility
of first amendment impingement 78 and justified extension of union secu-
rity arrangements to the public employment sector. The provision of the
Michigan statute found constitutional in Abood specifically established
an agency shop the validity of which had been determined in NLRB v.
General Motors Corp. 79
Admittedly, labor-related considerations in Abood might merit the
majority's desire to promote exclusive representation for issues germane
to collective bargaining. As the majority indicated, opposing individual
demands for improved conditions could result in conflict rather than
stability. In addition, without compulsory dues requirements, nonunion
employees would receive benefits without paying the costs of obtaining
them. Certain aspects of Abood, however, make it properly distin-
guishable from Hanson and Street. Justice Powell clearly indicated these
differences in his concurrence, faulting the majority's reliance on Han-
son and Street to legalize agency shops for government employees.10 In
Workers v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 415 (1976); NLRB v. General Motors Corp.,
373 U.S. 734, 740-741 (1963). In both cases the Court upheld the unfair labor practices
provisions of the Labor Management Relations Act by employing the Hanson-Street
rationale.
75. 431 U.S. at 224.
76. Id. at 229-30, quoting Summers, Public Sector Bargaining: Problems of Govern-
mental Decisionmaking, 44 CiN. L. REV. 669, 670 (1976). "The uniqueness of public
employment is not in the employees nor in the work performed .
77. 431 U.S. at 229.
78. See id. at 224-25.
79. 373 U.S. 734 (1%3). Hanson and Street involved union shop provisions. See note
18 supra. But, as the Court indicated in Abood, the earlier cases were concerned simply
with financial support requirements rather than compulsory membership. Therefore, the
Court found it unnecessary to distinguish between the two types of provisions. 431 U.S. at
217 n.10.
80. Id. at 244-55. (Powell, J. concurring).
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Powell's opinion, the Hanson Court had sanctioned union shop agree-
ments pursuant to the Railway Labor Act because it concluded that
government participation in enacting the legislation resulted in no first
amendment violation."' His argument appears valid. A reading of Han-
son implies that the Act merely authorized private establishment of
union shops for collective bargaining purposes. 82 Justice Powell further
suggested that the Street Court had reiterated the permissive nature of
the Railway Labor Act and had, in addition, emphasized that Congress
never intended to provide unions with'a means for forcing employees to
support political causes they oppose.8 3 Thus, in both instances the un-
ions were free to impose or reject union shop provisions. In contrast to
the purely private agreements of Hanson and Street, the provision in
Abood had been negotiated and adopted by the Detroit Board of Educa-
tion, a state agency. Consequently, membership in the teachers' union
was state-compelled84 and the Hanson-Street analysis negating govern-
ment action which compelled association under the Railway Labor Act is
clearly inapplicable. As Justice Powell indicated, the permissive nature
of the Railway Labor Act, which enabled execution of private union
security provisions, was absent in the Michigan statute, 85 which com-
pelled the execution of public union security provisions. Consequently,
first amendment concerns in Abood were distinguishable from those in
the cases on which the majority relied. 86 In Hanson and Street, the
employer was not the government and consequently a government was
not conditioning employment on a prohibitive loss of associational
81. Id. at 245-46.
82. 351 U.S. at 231. "The union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act is only
permissive. Congress has not compelled nor required carriers and employees to enter
union shop agreements." Id. (emphasis added). See also International Ass'n of Machin-
ists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 749 (1961).
83. 431 U.S. at 247-48. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 768:
"§ 2, Eleventh [does not vest] the unions with unlimited power to spend exacted
money. . . .Its use to support candidates for public office, and advance political pro-
grams, is not a use which helps defray the expenses of the negotiation or administration of
collective agreements, or the expenses entailed in the adjustment of grievances and
disputes."
84. Justice Powell asserted that the Hanson Court did not lose sight of the fact that the
union shop provision of the Railway Labor Act was not government compelled, but rather
had emphasized its permissive nature. See 431 U.S. at 245-46 (Powell, J., concurring).
In response to Justice Powell's argument, the majority asserted that nothing in Hanson
suggested that a union shop agreement involving indirect government action would be less
offensive to the first amendment than the provision in Abood, stating, "[T]he First
Amendment . . .forbids any abridgement by government whether directly or indirectly."
Id. at 227 n.23 citing International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. at 777
(Douglas, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 252-53.
86. See text accompanying notes 76-83 supra.
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rights.a7 In Abood, the government, acting as an employer, required
adherence to an agency shop provision.
The majority's failure to distinguish between government authoriza-
tion of private union security provisions and government-compelled
financial support for public sector unions resulted in its denial of a first
amendment infraction. The fallacy of the majority's analysis becomes
more evident upon studying the Court's conclusion that the compulsory
service charge imposed on the teachers could not be used for political
activities unrelated to collective bargaining. 8 The Court reasoned that
compelling nonunion employees to support objectionable political causes
would infringe upon their constitutional rights.8 9 The Court thus reaf-
firmed settled policy, recently reiterated in Elrod, that government em-
ployment cannot be conditioned on the loss of the first amendment right
of political association. The Court had accepted, however, the principle
that public employee unions might aptly be termed political" and that
"decisionmaking by a public employer is above all a political process." 91
The public employer provides public sector unions with their unique
political strength,92 for it is responsible to the electorate. 93 Labor policy
decisions directly affect the electorate, which ultimately finances the
87. Absent a compelling state interest, public employment cannot be conditioned on
loss of first amendment rights. See, e.g., cases cited note 58 supra. As Justice Powell
indicated in concurrence, "The Court apparently endorse[d] the principle that the State
infringes interests protected by the First Amendment when it compels an individual to
support the political activities of others as a condition of employment." 431 U.S. at 245.
88. Id. at 1800.
89. Id. at 234-35 & n.31. "[A]t the heart of the First Amendment is the notion that an
individual should be free to believe as he will, and that in a free society one's beliefs
should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State." Id. at
234-35. See also Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347,356-57 (1976); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S.
557, 565 (1969); West Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 2%, 303-304 (1940).
90. 431 U.S. at 231. The Court's concession reflects the opinions of several commen-
tators. See, e.g., Comment, Collective Bargaining for Public Employees and the Prevention
of Strikes in the Public Sector, 68 MICH. L. REV. 260, 273-74 (1969); Project, supra note
12.
91. 431 U.S. at 228. See notes 99-102 & accompanying text infra. See also Summers,
supra note 11, at 1156; Clark, Politics and Public Employee Unionism: Some Recom-
mendations for an Emerging Problem, 44 CIN. L. REV. 680 (1975); Summers, supra note
76.
92. See Summers, supra note 76. It is interesting to note that the Court cited the
Summers article for the proposition that the only difference between a public employee
and a private employee is the nature of the employer, and accepted Summers' thesis that
collective bargaining in the public sector is political. 431 U.S. at 230. Thus, it is more
difficult to understand the reasoning behind the Court's decision that if political expenses
are proven, the plaintiffs will be entitled to relief.
93. See Summers, supra note 76, at 672; Comment, supra note 90, at 273-74. See also
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. at 230; Hortonville Joint School Dist. v.
Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482, 495 (1976).
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employer's expenditures through taxes and supports or rejects the em-
ployer's policies at the polls. Frequently, government policies, such as
budget decisions, are legislative determinations made in response to
anticipated or existing community needs.9 4 Ideological determinations,
such as educational policies, are made by official government represen-
tatives and are shaped by community desires.9 Should the electorate
disagree with policies established for them by the government employer,
they can replace the officials responsible for the employer's policy
decisions.96 But the strength of the electorate is derived from the solidar-
ity of the various public interest groups of which it is comprised. 97
Unionized government employees enjoy a special position in the elec-
torate because they can exercise their political influence as a cohesive
public interest group to obtain advantageous policies or to "place per-
sons in positions of power" who are receptive to their outlook. 98 Public
officials, frequently indebted to public unions for their political position,
are the same officials who sit across the bargaining table from the union
representative99 or are members of the legislative body which ratifies the
bargaining agreement. 0 Respect for the source of their political promi-
94. See Summers, supra note I1, at 1159.
95. Id. at 1156, 1177-1183.
96. See Comment, supra note 90, at 274.
97. See Project, supra note 12, at 949. "[T]here is never a debt to the general public per
se; the debts are only owed to various organized interest groups." See also Summers
supra note 76, at 674. Public employee unions are not necessarily a more powerful public
interest group than any other, but they usually have sufficient funds and personnel to
funnel to their political efforts to assure them substantial success. Project, supra note 12,
at 946. The Project study comprehensively discusses union lobbying activities and efforts
to get sympathetic voters to the polls, and provides examples of politician-union court-
ships during elections. A significant distinction between the union as an interest group and
other public interest groups, however, is that after elections "the unions and the elected
officials must still bargain together and work together to keep the government running."
Id. at 947.
98. 431 U.S. at 257 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell compared public sector
unions to traditional political parties in their objectives. He suggested that both were
interested in influencing government decision making and obtaining the election of per-
sons favorable to their policies. See Project, supra note 12, at 948, which proposes that
"unions are now deeply involved in ... [politics to further] their own . . . self interest
by electing officials who will be responsive to their needs." See also Shaw & Clark, The
Practical Differences Between Public and Private Sector Collective Bargaining, 19
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 867, 872 (1972) in which it is suggested that "end runs"-direct appeals
to a legislative body which circumvent the bargaining table-are an effective and often
employed method by which public sector unions obtain favorable legislation and condi-
tions. The method is effective because legislators frequently come from organized labor or
have political ties to union groups.
99. See note 97 supra. See also Summers, supra note 76, at 684.
100. City charters or state constitutions frequently establish proper negotiation proce-
dure. Distinct from private collective bargaining, the public negotiator's agreement could
necessitate legislative ratification. See Summers, supra note 76, at 670-71. "[E]ven [in]
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nence must influence their policies toward union demands.' 0 The sub-
jects of public sector bargaining negotiations are, by their nature, politi-
cal since they either reflect voter sentiment or affect the entire communi-
ty. While determinations as to wages, hours, class size, student disci-
pline and public services are working conditions appropriate for bargain-
ing, they can result in either increased taxes or altered availability of
services. These issues which affect community life, and thus might
reasonably evoke community reaction, are political. 102 The public union
employee, as a member of the community, may not agree with union
goals on these issues. Reason would seem to dictate, therefore, that to
require payment of a service charge to support public union collective
bargaining not only compels political association as a prerequisite for
public employment, 10 3 but also demands compulsory political association
abhorrent to the first amendment.
The Abood majority in fact acknowledged the probable difficulty
courts would face distinguishing public union collective bargaining "for
which contributions [might] be compelled" from "ideological activities
unrelated to collective bargaining"' 1 4 for which compulsory financial
support would be unconstitutional. It is difficult, therefore, to justify the
Court's failure to recognize the political strength of public sector un-
ions '05 and its belief that compulsory contributions by public employees
to the cost of exclusive union representation works no greater infringe-
ment on their constitutional freedoms than permitting union shops in the
the most sophisticated of collective bargaining systems, legislative approval of at least the
budgetary portions of a negotiated agreement is required." Project, supra note 12, at 923
(footnote omitted).
101. "[T]here is doubt that an elected official who has received considerable support
from an employee union could subsequently be objective in dealing with matters of
concern to that union." Project, supra note 12, at 1039 (footnote omitted).
102. See notes 94-96 & accompanying text .supra. See also Project, supra note 12, at
1018, which suggests that there is a constant tension between citizen and union demands
which causes "[t]he ultimate decision on wages and employment... [to depend]...
on an assessment by elected officials of the relative political strengths of union, taxpayer
and other interest groups." Cf. Summers, supra note 76, at 673. In the Summers article,
the author concludes that "one of the principal justifications for public employment
bargaining is to counteract the overriding political strength of other voters who constantly
press for lower taxes and increased services." Id. at 675.
103. See cases cited in note 58 supra. See also the concurring opinion of Justice
Rehnquist, in which he finds the Abood majority's reasoning contrary to that of the Elrod
plurality, which required that each citizen be able to act and believe according to his own
wishes. 431 U.S. at 242-43 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
104. Id. at 236.
105. Although the Court declined to acknowledge the relevancy of its decision uphold-
ing the Hatch Act, ch. 410, 53 Stat. 1147 (1939) (currently codified at 18 U.S.C. §§ 591-613
(1970)), it is noteworthy that recognition of the political power of government employees
was responsible for Hatch Act legislation.
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private sector. 1°6 The majority erroneously presumes that freedom of
association will be preserved because dissenters may publicly make
known their objections to union ideologies. 107 Given the unique political
potential of public employee unions both to secure programs favorable to
them as well as to promote the election of sympathetic legislators, 10 8
public agency shop provisions may stifle protesters. By assuring public
union support for those in power who favor union policies, such provi-
sions effectively curtail political opposition. Causing the voice of the
dissenter to be inconsequential could effectively eliminate the dissent. It
would seem to follow, therefore, that notwithstanding the availability of
a public forum to nonunion dissenters, compelling agency shop member-
ship of public employees can be likened to governmentally compelled
political association.l°9 By curtailing political opposition, union security
agreements thus have the precise effect of the patronage practices de-
plored by the Elrod holding.
In his concurrence Justice Rehnquist maintained that the Abood opin-
ion failed to preserve the requisite Elrod principle that a citizen must
constitutionally be permitted "unfettered judgment . . . on matters of
political concern.""10 The public employee may dissent, but, as the Court
reasoned in Elrod, the average government employee generally lacks
finances to support his personal political position. Thus, the service
charge imposed to further collective bargaining efforts detracts from the
employee's own political and ideological beliefs, should they differ from
106. See note 77 & accompanying text supra. Several commentators have suggested,
contrary to the Abood Court's reasoning, that failure to accord recognition to the political
strength of public sector unions is equivalent to failure to recognize the dangers of
government authorization of agency shops. See Clark, supra note 91, at 680-681:
[T]oo little attention has been paid to political aspects of public sector collective
bargaining and the potential problems and distortions of the political process that
will result if remedies are not instituted . . . the extension of broad collective
bargaining rights to public employee unions who participate actively in the elec-
tion of officials with whom they negotiate at the bargaining table gives public
sector unions a disproportionate amount of power which will distort the political
process.
But see Summers, supra note 76, at 675. It is noteworthy that in Michigan the rule is that
when a municipal collective bargaining agreement conflicts with an otherwise valid
municipal ordinance, the ordinance yields to the agreement. 431 U.S at 253 (Powell, J.,
concurring). This would seem to partially substantiate Justice Powell's conclusion that
"[t]he collective bargaining agreement to which a public agency is a party... has all of
the attributes of legislation for the subjects with which it deals." Id. at 252-53 (Powell, J.,
concurring).
107. 431 U.S. at 230. See also City of Madison School Dist. v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n., 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
108. See note 106 supra.
109. See 431 U.S. at 243. (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
110. Id.
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the union's, and is "tantamount to coerced belief" and association. I II It
would seem that Justice Rehnquist properly concluded that there is no
constitutional distinction between a governmentally imposed require-
ment that a public employee belong to a particular political party to
maintain his position and a similar requirement that public employees
contribute to collective bargaining expenses of labor unions.' 12
In sustaining the validity of public sector agency shop provisions, the
Abood Court granted public sector unions extensive control over gov-
ernment decisionmaking policies" 13 and imposed seemingly unprecedent-
ed restrictions on the exercise of the public employee's individual politic-
al rights. The state's interest in labor stability, cited by the majority as a
justification for public sector agency shops, does not seem sufficiently
compelling to warrant such a sacrifice of individual first amendment
guarantees. The majority in Abood apparently disregarded its own state-
ment that "in a free society one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind
and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.""' 4
III. CONCLUSION
Abood represents an unsuccessful attempt to reconcile two counter-
vailing policies-freedom of public employee political association and
the constitutionality of agency shop agreements. Relying on traditional
reasoning that stability of labor relations provided by exclusive represen-
tation outweighs possible first amendment infraction the Court deter-
mined that agency shop provisions for the public sector are constitution-
al. The logic which supported private agency shop validity is, however,
unconvincing when applied to public union labor relations. Freedom of
political association is a significantly greater concern for nonunion public
employees, who often must finance union political activity in the guise of
collective bargaining.' 15 Although the Abood Court specifically declared
that service fees exacted from nonunion members could not be applied to
union political activities, 1 6 careful examination of the nature and prac-
111. Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 356.
112. 431 U.S. at 243-44 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
113. See note 196 supra. It has been asserted that the traditionally low rate of voter
participation in local elections could work to the advantage of public unions which are
effective at the polls. Project, supra note 12, at 1039.
114. 431 U.S. at 235.
115. This article does not purport to discuss the necessity for collective bargaining for
public employees. It should be noted, nevertheless, that commentators generally agree
that it is essential to counteract the taxpayers' battle against increasing expenditures. See,
e.g., Summers, supra note 11, at 1167; Summers, supra note 76, at 674-75.
116. Left open was the question of a proper standard for determining collective
bargaining as opposed to political activity. Since the case reached the Court on the
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tices of unions reveals that collective bargaining activities are largely
political, a fact which the majority deemphasized. The Court appears to
impose association as a prerequisite for state employment because the
majority declined to recognize that sanctioning public agency shops
could be fairly equated with curtailing the constitutional right of political
association previously guaranteed public employees.
An ancillary implication of the majority's attitude toward public sector
unions is possible public employee union domination of state legisla-
tion. 117 The potential for such union power presently exists in the sym-
biotic relationship enjoyed by elected policy-making officials and the
unions. 11 8 Officials responsible for government labor policy are naturally
responsive to demands made by those who have assured or are most apt
to assure their political success. This commonplace practice has a unique
significance for public sector unions which, unlike other public interest
groups, have additional access to governmental policy-makers through
collective bargaining. These officials and union representatives must
face each other to negotiate. The agreements they reach are political
determinations which affect the entire community. Thus, absent an
opposing interest group equally equipped to exert political influence on
these officials, public union collective bargaining agreements may tend
to become established state labor policy.
The Court's holding that agency shop assessments could not be used
for political purposes which nonunion employees oppose, eliminated one
of the uncertainties left by Hanson and Street. In extending agency shop
constitutionality to public sector unions, however, the majority seems to
have concluded that collective bargaining, which is essentially political,
is not political when it is collective bargaining. The net result of Abood
then is not a clarification of judicial policy regarding union security
provisions, but rather increased confusion regarding public employees'
constitutional rights.
Renie L Fox
pleadings and lacked an evidentiary record, the Court declined to address the question,
leaving the final determination to the Michigan court on remand. 431 U.S. at 236-37; see
note 21 supra.
117. See note 106 supra.
118. See notes 97, 98, & 101 supra.
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COMMUNICATIONS-The FCC, as an Alternative to Di-
vestment of Western Electric, Ordered Greater Autonomy
for the Bell Operating Companies in Purchasing Decisions.
In re AT&T, 64 F.C.C.2d 1 (1977).
One of the inevitable side effects of large scale industrialization is the
development of the vertically integrated industry, that is, an industry in
which plants producing goods in the various stages between the raw
material and the finished product are centrally owned and controlled by a
holding company.I The steady growth of these companies has occurred
in response to the significant economic benefits accruing from integra-
tion. Primarily, the vertically integrated firm is freed from dependence
on others for raw materials and sales outlets. 2 In addition, it is able to
coordinate anticipated demand for its product with the production of raw
materials needed to meet the demand. 3 These factors promote manufac-
turing efficiency which results in reduced waste of raw materials, labor,
and managerial expertise in the production and distribution processes.
The cost of production is thus reduced and the product can be offered to
consumers at a price lower than can be provided by independent firms.
Vertical integration, however, may also result in a loss of competitive
benefits to the consumer. Competition theoretically assures that prod-
ucts will be manufactured at the least possible cost.4 But vertically
integrated industries reduce competition by restricting the access of
independent manufacturers and purchasers to the firms within the verti-
cally integrated industry and by restricting the ability of integrated firms
to purchase and sell outside the vertically integrated structure.
To curb the loss of these competitive benefits, the government has
attempted to control private and public vertically integrated industries
through antitrust laws and regulation respectively. The traditional reme-
dy in antitrust cases has been elimination of the integrated structure by
divestment of the firm which was reducing competition. Regulatory
agencies, however, have allowed retention of the firm so long as it is part
I. A holding company is any company which is in a position to control or materially
influence the management of one or more other companies by virtue, in part at least, of its
ownership of securities in the other company or companies. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
865 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
2. A. MURAD, ECONOMICS, PRINCIPLES AND PROBLEMS 50-51 (5th ed. 1970).
3. Some integrative benefits are also unique to the type of industry involved. For a
listing of integrative benefits accruing to the Bell System, see note 20 infra.
4. See J. GWARTNEY, ECONOMICS 54 (1st ed. 1976).
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of a vertically integrated public utility 5 structure. Neither approach is
satisfactory since divestment results in the loss of integrative benefits
while retention of the plant continues the loss of competitive benefits.
Recently, in In re AT&T, 6 the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) employed a novel approach to retain both integrative and competi-
tive benefits by ordering maximum separation short of divestment of the
Bell System telecommunications equipment manufacturer from the Bell
operating telephone companies which purchase the equipment.
The Bell System is a wide-ranging conglomerate consisting of the
American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T), AT&T's tele-
phone subsidiaries, which are Bell's operating telephone companies, 7 the
Western Electric Company, and Western Electric subsidiaries.' In addi-
tion, Western Electric is wholly owned by AT&T and is the Bell Sys-
tem's manufacturing and supply affiliate. 9 Overall direction and control
of the Bell System is provided by AT&T, the holding company, through
its General Department.' 0 The relationships among the various enter-
prises are further strengthened through a series of contracts between
Western and the operating telephone companies under which the latter
are not required to purchase from Western Electric although Western
assumes the obligation of providing them with equipment and supplies."I
Because of peculiarities in the process of deciding to make or purchase a
product, the great bulk of Western Electric's sales, however, are made
directly to the operating companies.12 The FCC found that this interrela-
5. A public utility is a business or service which is engaged in regularly supplying the
public with some commodity or service which is of public consequence and need, such as
electricity, gas, water, transportation, or telephone or telegraph service. See BLACK,
supra note 1, at 1395. This distinguishes a public utility from a private firm and over-
shadows the fact that both may be privately owned. In addition, economies of scale which
result in increases in efficiency comparable to increases in firm size are particularly
pronounced in public utilities. As a result, these firms are generally given exclusive
franchises by the government. But, in return, the government reserves the right to
regulate the operations of such monopolies to prevent abuses of the monopoly power it
has granted.
6. 64 F.C.C.2d 1 (1977) (Final Decision).
7. AT&T holds most of the stock in 21 telephone operating companies and a substan-
tial portion of the stock of two others in the United States. In re AT&T, 64 F.C.C.2d 131,
143 (1976) (Initial Decision) (Kraushaar, J., presiding).
8. Id. at 143.
9. Id. at 144. The telecommunications equipment market is composed of two seg-
ments: 70% for Western Electric and 30% for independent equipment manufacturers. Id.
at 159-60.
10. The General Department funds Bell Laboratory's research and provides central-
ized advice and assistance to the Bell operating telephone companies through license
service contracts on financing, patent services, and regulatory matters. Id at 17.
11. Id. at 163.
12. Id. at 144.
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tionship inherently biased equipment procurement by the operating com-
panies. Thus, the FCC concluded that independent equipment manufac-
turers were placed at a competitive disadvantage to Western Electric in
supplying the operating companies, 3 and, therefore, that the prices the
operating companies paid for equipment were kept artificially high.
Although the internal relationships of the Bell entities and the prices
that they charge each other for their various goods and services are not
subject to review by the FCC, rates charged to consumers must be
approved by that body.' 4 As a result of declining profits, AT&T filed for
interstate rate increases on November 20, 1970. Accordingly, an investi-
gation 5 was undertaken by the FCC into the legality of the rate charges
of AT&T and associated Bell System companies.' 6 Among the number of
inquiries made,'17 particular emphasis was given to the relationship of
Western Electric to the operating telephone companies because of con-
cern that the relationship did not contribute to the efficiency of the Bell
operation.
The FCC assigned the case to Administrative Law Judge Kraushaar18
who found, in the Initial Decision,' 9 that the integrated Bell structure
provided certain benefits2 ° that weighed against divestment, despite a
13. See notes 82-85 & accompanying text infra.
14. Thirty days prior to the effective date of rate changes, every common carrier is
required to notify the FCC of the changes and to publish the new rate schedule. Upon
complaint, or under its own initiative, the FCC may then conduct a hearing on the
lawfulness of the rate change. If the FCC finds the change unlawful, it may suspend the
rate change and prescribe just and reasonable charges. Communications Act of 1934, 47
U.S.C. §§ 203-05, 403 (1970).
15. In addition to pre-hearing discovery conducted by the Commission's trial staff (see
note 22 & accompanying text infra), the Commission awarded outside contracts for the
study of various aspects of the Bell System. See note 78 infra.
16. 64 F.C.C.2d at 134-35. The investigation was initiated by a Commission Order of
Jan. 20, 1971 (27 F.C.C.2d 149), and by Memorandum Opinion and Order of Jan. 21, 1971
(27 F.C.C.2d 151).
17. The investigation was divided into two phases. Phase One was limited primarily to
the determination of a fair rate of return on Bell's interstate markets. 64 F.C.C.2d at 135.
This casenote discusses Phase Two, which was designated as an investigation into all
other aspects of Bell's interstate revenue requirements, the rate structure for Bell's
Message Telecommunications Service, and the integrated corporate structure of the Bell
System. Id.
18. The Commission may delegate its hearing functions to an administrative law judge
when necessary to the proper functioning of the FCC and to the prompt and orderly
conduct of its business. In every case of adjudication which has been so delegated, the
judge is required to prepare an initial decision. 47 U.S.C. §§ 155(d)(1), 409(a) (1970).
19. In re AT&T, 64 F.C.C.2d 131 (1976).
20. The judge found that ratepayers had generally benefited from Western Electric's
manufacturing activities being subordinate to the needs of the Bell operating companies.
Specifically, he found that new configurations and systems were introduced whenever it
appeared that these would benefit the operating companies, without regard to Western
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less than fully competitive market in the telecommunications equipment
field. In an effort to balance the integrative benefits of the Bell System
with the need for improving competition in the equipment market, the
judge ordered greater autonomy from Western Electric for the Bell
operating telephone companies when procuring equipment and
supplies.21
Simultaneous with the delegation of the matter to Judge Kraushaar,
the Commission appointed a trial staff2" to conduct part of the investiga-
tion and to make recommendations.2 3 The trial staff recommended to
Judge Kraushaar, prior to his order, that because of certain inefficiencies
in Western and the Bell System 24 and because of the potential for
anticompetitive abuse as well as equipment market foreclosure by Bell,25
Western Electric be divested. After the judge issued his order, the trial
staff recommended its implementation only as an interim step until
divestment of Western Electric could be effectuated. 26 The FCC, howev-
er, found the investigation inadequate to support any decision on divest-
ment and upheld Judge Kraushaar's order. 27 In so doing, the FCC found
that the judge's analysis of integrative and competitive benefits support-
ed his decision to order greater autonomy in lieu of divestment.
Electric's interest as a manufacturer in regular production with a minimum of design
changes. Judge Kraushaar also found that Western maintained additions and replacement
parts for up to 40 years, thereby providing a stable source for the operating companies,
and that Western Electric was obligated to gear up in advance of actual equipment and
material orders in order to supply estimated future requirements of the operating com-
panies. Id. at 151.
21. Judge Kraushaar's orders provided, among other things, that:
(a) Bell shall submit . . . measures for the implementation of its policy, which
shall include greater autonomy (centrally enforced) of the operating tele-
phone companies of the Bell System in the acquisition of telecommunica-
tions equipment from all available sources;
(b) Bell shall likewise adopt. . . formal procedures for the objective evaluation
of general trade products on a continuing basis and institute specific proce-
dures to insure a free-flow of requirements and product compatibility infor-
mation and data between and among its components and the general trade.
Id. at 501-02.
22. The trial staff was independent of both the Commission and Judge Kraushaar. Its
members were drawn from the Common Carrier Bureau of the Commission and from
outside consultants. Id. at 4.
23. The trial staff was employed to separate the investigating and prosecuting func-
tions of the hearing from the review function of the administrative law judge as the
Communications Act requires. 47 U.S.C. § 155(d)(8) (1970).
24. See notes 81-83 & accompanying text infra.
25. 64 F.C.C.2d at 8.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 10, 44-45.
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I. CONTROLLING VERTICALLY INTEGRATED INDUSTRIES IN THE
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS
The primary goal of antitrust litigation against private holding com-
panies has been to increase competitive benefits to the public. Initially,
the antitrust laws were invoked only against corporate mergers that
resulted in horizontal monopolies 28 and not against mergers that resulted
in vertical monopolies. 29 Finally, in 1957, the antitrust laws were invoked
against vertical corporate mergers in United States v. E.L du Pont de
Nemours & Co. 30 Du Pont was a supplier of automotive finishes and
fabrics to General Motors Corporation. Between 1917 and 1919, du Pont
purchased a twenty-three percent stock interest in the automotive giant.
This acquisition enabled it to become entrenched as General Motors'
primary supplier, resulting in a substantial lessening of competition in the
automotive finishes and fabrics market.3 To alleviate this situation, the
government sued, charging that the stock accumulation violated sections
one and two of the Sherman Antitrust Act32 and section seven of the
Clayton Act. 33 Reversing the district court's 34 dismissal of the complaint,
28. A horizontal monopoly consists of several plants, under one management, engaged
in the same kind of business which would, if they were under independent management,
compete with each other. See MURAD, supra note 2, at 51.
29. To deal with monopolies based on sheer size, Congress enacted a series of antitrust
laws, primarily the Sherman and the Clayton Antitrust Acts. The Sherman Act, passed in
1890, prohibits combinations in restraint of interstate and foreign commerce and forbids
monopolies and attempts to monopolize. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970). The Clayton Act,
passed in 1914, supplements the Sherman Act and prohibits local price discrimination,
tying contracts which forbid a buyer to use goods which compete with those of the seller,
and interlocking directorates. 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970). The antitrust laws were not
invoked against vertical mergers until 1957 when vertical monopolies began to restrain
competition. Problems with vertical monopolies have mirrored the growth of corporations
to mammoth proportions in the last several decades.
30. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
31. The primary issue was whether du Pont's commanding position as General Motors'
(GM) supplier of fabrics and finishes had been achieved through competitive effort or
through acquisition of GM's stock. Id. at 588-89. Even though du Pont had obtained the
commanding position as GM's supplier, the Court noted that neither company had over-
looked considerations of price, quality, and service, and that the executives had acted in
the best interests of their own companies. The Court found these factors irrelevant,
however, because intent to monopolize is not necessary to violate the Clayton Act. Id. at
606-07.
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970). "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal...." 15 U.S.C. § 1(1970). Section 2 makes
it illegal to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other
person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
33. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 18
(1970)) provides in pertinent part:
That no corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,
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the Supreme Court found that du Pont's acquisition of the stock had
resulted in the creation of a monopoly in a vertical supplier-customer
relationship. 35 However, the Court did not discuss or recognize the
benefits of the vertical integration. Rather, the Court simply ruled that
section seven of the Clayton Act, prior to its amendment in 1950,36
applied to vertical as well as horizontal mergers. This ruling was based
on the Court's review of the legislative history of the Act which indicated
that Congress intended section seven to cover the corporate acquisition
of the stock of any corporation, competitor or not, which restrained
commerce in any community or tended to create a monopoly of any line
of commerce. 37 On remand,38 the district court selected a "pass
through" of voting rights as a more effective remedy39 than divestment.
Once again, the government appealed 40 and the Supreme Court reversed,
ordering du Pont to give up its General Motors stock. The Court noted
that divestment was the traditional and most effective remedy for anti-
trust violations. 41 Moreover, divestment was believed to be substantially
easier to oversee than the proposed "pass through" method. 42 Signifi-
the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital of another corporation
engaged also in commerce, where the effect of such acquisition may be to
substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is so ac-
quired and the corporation making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce
in any section or community, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of
commerce.
34. 126 F. Supp. 235 (N.D. 11. 1954).
35. 353 U.S. at 598-606.
36. Section 7 was amended to clarify its applicability to vertical as well as horizontal
mergers. H.R. REP. No. 1191, 81st Cong., Ist Sess. 11 (1949).
37. 353 U.S. at 591-92.
38. 177 F. Supp. I (N.D. 111. 1959). The district court invited the government and amici
curiae to submit plans to remedy the violations. The principal feature of the government's
proposed plan was a requirement that within 10 years du Pont divest itself of its GM stock.
See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 319 (1961). Du Pont
objected to the harsh income tax consequences of divestment and proposed its own plan
for relief, the salient feature of which was a "pass through" of voting rights. Thus, du
Pont would retain all attributes of ownership of the GM stock except the right to vote
which would be "passed through" to du Pont stockholders. Id. at 320. The district court
had chosen the "pass through" remedy because it would have less serious tax and market
consequences for du Pont and GM stockholders. Id. at 320-21.
39. The "pass through" remedy was intended to restrict contact between du Pont and
GM officers thereby preventing any preferential relations between the two. The remedy
was based on the assumption that the du Pont shareholders who voted the GM stock
would not vote as a block. 177 F. Supp. at 39-42.
40. 366 U.S. 316 (1961).
41. Id. at 328-33.
42. A "pass through" of voting rights would require policing which would probably
involve the courts and the government more deeply in the regulation of private affairs than
a simple order of divestment. In addition, the Court found it likely that in the "pass
through" plan, du Pont stockholders would vote their shares in such a way as to induce
GM to favor du Pont, thus rendering the remedy ineffective. Id. at 331, 334.
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cantly, the Court ignored the effect of divestment in eliminating the
benefits of vertical integration .43
In contrast, the benefits of vertical integration have long been recog-
nized and taken into account by regulatory agencies and the judiciary in
regulating public utilities such as the Bell System. As with private hold-
ing companies, public utilities have been limited in the extent of their
holdings, but the limitations have been ordered specifically with the
benefits of vertical integration in mind. North American Co. v. SEC44
and SEC v. New England Electric System 45 both limited permissible
holdings to one vertically integrated public utility system. North Ameri-
can was a holding company which controlled competing electric and gas
utilities in a horizontal monopoly. Pursuant to the Public Utility Holding
Company Act of 1935,6 the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) ordered North American to divest its gas utilities and to retain
only those securities connected with the primary integrated electric
system. 47 North American appealed and the court of appeals affirmed
the SEC's orders." The Supreme Court also rejected North American's
challenge and upheld the constitutionality of section eleven of the Hold-
ing Company Act. 49 The Court reasoned that under the commerce
clause, Congress has the legislative power to allay its concern that the
extension of public utility holding companies might not reflect the advan-
tages of integration.5" The Court found that this power was expressed in
section eleven of the Act and in an exception to this section which
permits retention of additional integrated systems by the holding com-
pany only if they are relatively small, located close to the primary
43. Justice Frankfurter, in dissent, noted that the district court's overriding concern
had to be the protection of the public interest, which would include capturing integrative
benefits. Id. at 359. He also argued that the public interest could be protected by ordering
divestment only when remedies less harsh and as effective as divestment were not
available. Id. at 364.
44. 327 U.S. 686 (1946).
45. 384 U.S. 176 (1966).
46. Section I l(b)(l), 15 U.S.C. § 79k(b)(l) (1970), authorizes the Securities and Ex-
change Commission to bring about the geographic and economic integration of public
utility holding companies.
47. See 327 U.S. at 690.
48. 133 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1943).
49. 327 U.S. at 703-05.
50. Id. In § l(b)(4) of the Holding Company Act, Congress specifically found that the
national public interest, the interest of utility investors and of utility consumers might be
adversely affected "when the growth and extension of holding companies bears no
relation to economy of management and operation or the integration and coordination of
related operating properties." Id. at 703.
Congress concluded from extensive studies made prior to passage of the Act that the
economic advantages of a holding company at the top of a sprawling unintegrated system
are not commensurate with the resulting economic disadvantages. Id at 708. For example,
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system, and unable to operate economically 5' after the loss of substantial
integrative benefits.52
Interpreting this exception was the central issue in New England
Electric System, in which the Supreme Court upheld the SEC's construc-
tion of section eleven.53 New England Electric was a holding company,
similar to North American, controlling both gas and electric utilities.5 4
The SEC had ruled that section eleven required a showing that the
independent operation of an additional system would cause serious im-
pairment of that system through the loss of integrative benefits enjoyed
through the retention of control by the holding company. New England
Electric was unable to show that the gas companies could not be
economically operated independently of it. Consequently, the SEC or-
dered divestment of the gas utilities, reasoning that any loss of
economies would be offset by the competitive benefits to be gained from
divestment.55 New England Electric appealed and the court of appeals
vacated the Commission's order5 6 on the ground that it had misinter-
preted what constituted loss of economies. The Supreme Court, how-
ever, upheld the Commission's interpretations, finding that Congress
could reasonably have intended to create only a limited exception to the
general rule confining holding companies to a single integrated utility
system. 7 The Court added that the SEC had considered the integrative
benefits as well as the loss of competitive benefits caused by the reten-
tion of competing utilities. 58
As is demonstrated by North American and New England Electric
System, the regulatory agencies, Congress, and the courts favor the
vertical integration of public utilities and limit the pursuit of competitive
benefits to control of horizontal monopolies. These bodies, however,
have ignored the potential benefits to be gained from increasing competi-
tion within the integrated structure of public utilities. Such benefits were
recognized by the courts in the initial approach to control of the inte-
a holding company might restrict competition between its holdings, such as gas and
electric utilities.
51. Operating economically refers to maintaining the prices of the additional integrated
system at a level competitive with the prices of the primary system.
52. Id. at 696-97.
53. 384 U.S. at 179.
54. Id. at 177.
55. Id. at 177-79.
56. 346 F.2d 399 (Ist Cir. 1965).
57. 384 U.S. at 179-81.
58. The Court noted that potential competitive advantages of divestment are difficult
to forecast. Whether the gains to competition offset the estimated losses in economies of
operation resulting from divestment of the gas properties is a matter for Commission
expertise in dealing with the total competitive situation. Id. at 184-85.
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grated structure of the Bell System. The vertical relationship of AT&T
and Western Electric first came under judicial scrutiny in 1949 when the
Justice Department initiated an antitrust action attacking the legality of
this relationship. 59 The complaint sought divestment of Western by
AT&T in order to restore competition in the telecommunications equip-
ment market. The suit was ended in 1956 with a final judgment against
Bell with the consent of the parties.' ° Aware of the integrative benefits
inherent in the Bell structure, the Justice Department had refused to
allow expansion of Western Electric into additional markets, but permit-
ted the vertical arrangement to continue. 61
Finally, in In re Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tele-
phone Service,62 the FCC addressed the vertically integrated structure of
the Bell System and the problem of increasing competition in the tele-
communications equipment market. 63 In that decision, the FCC attempt-
ed to restrict the scope of Western Electric's equipment monopoly and to
enlarge the competitive impact of independent equipment manufacturers
by invalidating tariffs which had prohibited the interconnection of cus-
tomer-owned devices with public telephone networks.64 The tariffs had
ensured a Western Electric monopoly by requiring customers to obtain
all devices for the telephone network from Bell. Telephone companies,
however, restricted the effectiveness of Carterfone by filing new tariffs
59. United States v. Western Elec. Co., Civil Action 17-49 (D.N.J. 1949).
60. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cases 71,134 (D.N.J. 1956).
61. In its pertinent parts the Consent Decree:
1. Enjoined AT&T and Western Electric from manufacturing any telephone
operating equipment of a type not sold to Bell companies.
2. Required AT&T and Western to grant a non-exclusive royalty-free license
under Western's then United States patents to any company wishing to
manufacture the same, and to grant similar licenses at reasonable non-
discriminatory royalties under all its future patents, as well as to furnish all
necessary technical information, to patent licensees.
1956 Trade Cases at 71,137, 71,139.
Otherwise, the fundamental relationships between AT&T, Western Electric and the
operating companies were not altered. Western continued as the manufacturing and
supply affiliate of the Bell System, but was severed from the remaining telephone
operating and manufacturing companies in the United States.
62. 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968). The Carterfone is a device which allows the interconnec-
tion of a two-way radio caller and a caller on a telephone through a base station. 13
F.C.C.2d at 420-21.
63. The case was initially filed by Carterfone against Bell in Texas. The district court
held that the special competence and expertise of the FCC gave it the right to determine
the validity of Bell's tariff preventing connection of the Carterfone to Bell System
telephones. Carter v. AT&T Co., 250 F. Supp. 188 (N.D. Tex. 1966), aff'd, 365 F.2d 486
(5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1008 (1967).
64. The hearing examiner concluded that the continued prohibition against Carterfone
would be inequitable and discriminatory in favor of the telephone company-owned inter-
connecting devices. 13 F.C.C.2d 430, 440 (1968).
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which required their personnel to install the equipment of the indepen-
dents 65 and were thus able to maintain their monopoly positions with
respect to interconnecting devices and their operating telephone com-
panies. 66
11. PURSUING COMPETITIVE BENEFITS IN VERTICALLY INTEGRATED
INDUSTRIES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR
Faced with this history of relatively ineffective attempts at increasing
competition in the telecommunications equipment market and of con-
trasting approaches to the control of vertically integrated industries, the
FCC took a fresh approach in In re AT&T by developing a middle
ground between divestment of Western Electric and maintenance of the
status quo. 67 Through this process the Commission hoped to capture and
retain all of the benefits of Bell's integrated structure while still increas-
ing competition. In so doing, however, the FCC failed to analyze signifi-
cantly either the effectiveness or the ease of administration of their
decision.
At the outset, the FCC rejected both the trial staff's recommendation
that Western Electric be divested and Judge Kraushaar's decision that
divestment was not warranted, 68 finding that the investigation upon
which the trial staff and Judge Kraushaar relied was insufficient to
support any decision on divestment. 69 The Commission noted that the
investigation was not designed to explore fully the overall competitive
impact of divestment of Western Electric on the telecommunications
equipment market, since it was only intended to consider the impact of
Western's divestment on telephone service adequacy and rates.7' The
65. After Carterfone, all telephone companies filed tariffs with the Commission pro-
viding for the interconnection of devices of a Carterfone nature so long as the telephone
company furnished, installed, and maintained the interconnect. This put a high premium on
getting a device from someone other than the connecting telephone company. See I.T.T.
v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153, 1179 (D. Hawaii 1972).
66. Id. at 1179.
67. 64 F.C.C.2d at 10, 42-45. Judge Kraushaar, the administrative law judge, had based
his decision against divestment on the manner in which the present Bell structure has
served the public interest. For example, the judge found that the integration of Western
Electric and Bell Labs in the Bell System has provided useful public benefits in the form
of system-wide expertise and innovations which have led, in turn, to monumental tech-
nological advances such as the transistor. Id. at 486.
68. Id. at 10.
69. Id.
70. Greater autonomy for Western would have some competitive impact on the tele-
communications equipment market, as would divestment. The difference in impact be-
tween greater autonomy and divestment is in the ability of equipment manufacturers to
compete when a divested Western begins selling directly to independent telephone com-
panies. In discussing unrestricted sales to independents, the Commission concluded that a
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Commission also indicated that no divestment plan was ever presented
or explored on the record. 7' As a result, no cost-benefit comparisons 72
could be made between the present Bell structure and a divested organi-
zation. 73
Adhering to the intended purpose and dcsign of the investigation, the
FCC emphasized the duty owed to ratepayers to see that they realize all
of the benefits to which they are entitled. 74 This was a departure from the
traditional approach taken in previous antitrust actions against private
holding companies in which competitive benefits are emphasized, and
from the traditional approach in regulatory actions in which integrative
benefits are emphasized. Nevertheless, the Commission examined both
forms of benefits and found that the overall performance of the Bell
System was excellent, generally providing high quality telephone service
at reasonable rates. 75 They also found, however, that considerable im-
provement in certain areas could make it more responsive to consumer
needs as well as to the technological innovations found in other sectors
of the telecommunications industry. The FCC noted that Western Elec-
tric's relationship with the Bell operating companies, especially its effi-
ciency and performance in supplying the operating companies, was a
primary area in which improvement could be made. 76
Western's efficiency and performance were crucial factors in the
divestment issue since the Commission believed that divestment of
Western would be appropriate only if its efficiency and performance
were unacceptable because of a lack of competition. Fortunately for the
corporation, several witnesses testified to the efficiency of Western
Electric's operation, 77 and studies commissioned both by Bell and the
competitive marketplace for serving Bell operating company needs should exist prior to
Western Electric entering the market. Id. at 25.
71. Id. at 10.
72. In this context, the Commission is referring to the cost or the charge to the
ratepayer of providing identical telecommunications services under a different Bell struc-
ture.
73. In contrast, in neither du Pont, North American Co. nor New England Electric
System did a decisionmaker discuss the relative cost-benefit efficiency of chosen reme-
dial structures over existing structures.
74. See, e.g., 64 F.C.C.2d at 12-13, 15-16. Numerous sections of the Communications
Act require the FCC to ensure that adequate service and reasonable rates and regulations
result from the vertically integrated Bell structure. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151, 154(i), 154(j), 303,
403 (1970).
75. 64 F.C.C.2d at 14-15. The administrative law judge had concluded that the United
States has the finest telephone system in the world in terms of quality and cost to the
ratepayer primarily because of the Bell System. Id. at 145-47.
76. Id. at 14-15.
77. Id. at 20-21.
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trial staff supported this testimony. 78 The Commission, however, ac-
knowledged criticisms of these studies 79 and agreed with Judge
Kraushaar that the evidence was entitled to some weight, but was not
conclusive as to Western's efficiency.80 Instead, the Commission stated
that Western Electric's construction program,8' its method of costing
and pricing equipment sold to the operating telephone companies, 82 and
its involvement in the Bell System decision process to make or buy
equipment were all areas in which it could become more efficient.
83
78. The Commission had awarded contracts to Touche Ross & Co., and to McKinsey
& Co., to conduct studies of Western's operations and performance looking primarily at
cost minimization, quality, and service. Both studies found Western to be an efficient,
well-managed company which had had a favorable impact on rates. Id. at 20-21.
79. The McKinsey study lacked specific evaluations of a number of subjects while the
Touche Ross study lacked scope and depth. Id. at 23.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 21-22.
82. Id. at 19-20, 22.
83. Id. at 32-33. Of these, the area to which the FCC gave the greatest attention was
the "make/buy" decision process, in which decisions to purchase a desired product from
the general equipment market or to have Western Electric provide the product are made.
Id. at 32-33. The primary participants in this process are AT&T marketing and legal
departments. These departments, in turn, involve other AT&T groups and management
staffs, including the Bell System Purchased Products Division (BSPPD). BSPPD arranges
for product evaluation and makes price comparison studies of general trade and Western's
products. BSPPD also provides a centralized interface with general trade suppliers,
assembles product information, and conducts negotiations on behalf of the operating
telephone companies for the purchase of products. Id. at 31.
The Commission focused on two aspects of the "make/buy" decision process in
concluding that the process inherently favors Western Electric. The first was the impor-
tance of the price comparison studies undertaken by BSPPD. These studies, which
compare Western's prices for telecommunications equipment with general trade prices,
provide data to the operating companies as an aid in their procurement decisions. The
studies were introduced by Bell in an attempt to demonstrate that Western offered lower
prices in all categories. Id. at 35. Judge Kraushaar concluded, however, and the Commis-
sion agreed, that their impact was marginal and that Western Electric probably created the
price differentials between Western and general trade products by abstaining from active
competition with the general trade in the independent telephone company market. Id.
Thus the differentials were found to be an invalid basis for a decision to purchase Western
products. In addition, the Commission found that the operating companies are given
virtually no managerial control and little influence in BSPPD and tend to rely on BSPPD
recommendations. Id. at 32 n.52, 43 n.65.
The second aspect on which the Commission focused was the role that Western Electric
plays in the "make/buy" decision process. The Commission found that Western had an
input into virtually every critical phase of the process including the determination whether
a new product is desirable, and whether the product should be made or bought. The
Commission concluded that this gave Western a substantial competitive advantage over
general trade suppliers seeking to serve the Bell operating companies' equipment needs.
Id. at 38-39. For example, Judge Kraushaar had found that Western Electric, unlike the
general trade, is the regular recipient of price comparison data, which has enabled
Western to make its prices competitive on products initially priced lower by the general
trade. Id. at 35.
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After establishing that Western's performance could be improved, the
FCC noted that increased competition in the equipment market, caused
largely by the Carterfone decision and technological advances, had al-
ready resulted in numerous substantial advantages to the Bell System.
84
Therefore, the Commission concluded that increased competition in the
operating companies' equipment procurement was necessary to solve the
problems of the "make/buy" decision process. Agreeing with Judge
Kraushaar, however, the Commission concluded that the vertically inte-
grated manner in which Western Electric and the operating companies
function and interact had resulted in many positive contributions to the
efficiency and performance of both Western and the Bell System. These
improvements were reflected in the quality and cost of telephone serv-
ice. 85 The Commission concluded that divestment would deprive con-
sumers of these benefits and, therefore, was not warranted.
Accordingly, it ordered the Bell System to submit a proposal to
achieve optimal separation of its equipment procurement and manufac-
turing functions short of divestment. 86 In taking this approach, the Com-
mission clearly attempted to capture the benefits of increased competi-
tion in the equipment market while retaining the integrative benefits of
the Bell System. Correspondingly, it departed from the traditional anti-
trust and regulatory solutions. As novel as this remedy was, however,
the Commission may have erred in employing it by failing to consider the
effectiveness of its method for increasing competition in the telecom-
munications equipment market. A controlling factor in the Court's deci-
sion in the remedy phase of du Pont was the effectiveness and ease of
administration of the proposed remedies.87 As evidenced by the Carter-
fone solution and the proposed "pass through" of voting rights in du
Pont, it is quite possible that this seemingly appropriate remedy can be
rendered ineffective. As a result of corporate loyalty, the Bell operating
companies could retain a bias for Western products even when the overt
source of that bias is eliminated. Moreover, as in Carterfone,88 Bell
might readily be able to introduce economic incentives not directly
related to equipment purchase that would encourage the operating com-
panies to continue purchasing from Western. If so, the FCC's novel
84. Id. at 26-27.
85. See note 20 supra.
86. 64 F.C.C.2d at 44-45. The Commission gave these guidelines: The operating com-
panies "should have centralized capabilities for performing the functions which include:
(a) make/buy and procurement decisions; (b) issuing of requests for proposals and evalua-
tion of responses in competitive bidding and other procurement situations; (c) purchasing;
and (d) inspection." Id. at 45.
87. 366 U.S. at 331-35.
88. See note 65 & accompanying text supra.
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approach to the control of vertically integrated public industry would be
rendered useless.
In addition, the FCC did not discuss administration of the remedy. A
significant factor in its rejection of a "pass through" of voting rights in
du Pont was the Court's fear of the burdensome requirements of super-
vision. 89 Yet, the same type of supervision would seem to be necessary
in the case at hand to ensure the effectiveness of the Commission's
remedy of greater autonomy for the operating companies. Unfortunate-
ly, financial constraints coupled with numerous other demands for the
FCC's time, could well prevent the Commission from hiring the person-
nel necessary to supervise the remedy, in which case the remedy again
would become ineffectual.
III. CONCLUSION
The FCC's "greater autonomy" remedy is a refreshing approach to
control of vertically integrated industries. In attempting to capture both
competitive and integrative benefits, the Commission goes beyond the
traditional approaches which focus on one form of benefits, and beyond
its own piecemeal remedy in Carterfone. In re AT&T, however, is
flawed because the Commission failed to consider the effectiveness of
its solution.
This flaw may require the Commission at some future date to pursue
yet another avenue of control over Bell's vertical structure. Moreover,
the remedy's weakness could be perpetuated if the courts and other
agencies follow the FCC's plan without analyzing its effectiveness. On
the other hand, In re AT&T provides firm precedent for the judiciary
and agencies in dealing with vertically integrated industries. The con-
sideration of both competitive and integrative benefits in designing reme-
dies for the control of vertically integrated monopolies is a step forward
that should ultimately benefit consumers through increased efficiency in
production.
Wade Wetherington
89. See note 42 & accompanying text supra.
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ABSTENTION-Federal Courts Should Ordinarily Abstain
From Intervening in Pending State Civil Proceedings Where
Substantial State Interests Are Involved. Juidice v. Vail,
430 U.S. 327 (1977).
Through 42 U.S.C. § 19831 and its jurisdictional counterpart, 2 Con-
gress vested federal courts with the power to enjoin state court proceed-
ings which threaten individual constitutional rights. Historically, howev-
er, the federal courts have been extremely reluctant to intervene in state
court cases, 3 especially when they are criminal in nature. 4 In the area of
civil litigation, the precise scope of this abstention doctrine has been the
subject of considerable debate, but the trend is toward increased federal
abstention. 5 Recently, in Juidice v. Vail,6 the Supreme Court moved
significantly closer to requiring abstention in all state civil cases, by
refusing to permit intervention in a state civil contempt proceeding. In so
ruling, the Court cast considerable doubt on the future viability of
section 1983 injunctive relief.'
The appellees in Juidice failed to satisfy judgments rendered against
them in various civil actions in New York state court.8 Consequently,
1. Section 1983, originally part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, provides as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jursidiction thereof to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970).
3. The Federal Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1970), prohibits federal injunctive
relief except when the injunction is "expressly authorized by Act of Congress," neces-
sary in aid of the jurisdiction of a federal court, or invoked to "protect or effectuate" a
federal court judgment. See, e.'g., Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 226 (1972).
4. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (federal court should abstain from
enjoining prosecution brought pursuant to state antisubversive statute); Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (federal court should abstain from interfering in criminal
prosecution in state court for violation of city ordinance). Cf. Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd.,
420 U.S. 592 (1975) (Court applied Younger principles in civil nuisance proceeding).
5. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, 89 HARV. L. REV. 47, 151-69 (1975); Note,
Younger Grows Older: Equitable Abstention in Civil Proceedings, 50 N.Y.U.L. REV. 870
(1975).
6. 430 U.S. 327 (1977).
7. Justice Brennan, in his dissent, viewed the majority opinion in Juidice as "stripping
all meaningful content from 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 342. See text accompanying notes
59-64 infra.
8. Originally there were eight named appellees. The district court ruled that the case
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they were served with court orders requiring their attendance at hearings
to show cause why they should not be held in contempt pursuant to state
law. 9 When they did not respond to the orders or attend the hearings,
contempt citations were issued against them, imposing fines and, in some
cases, imprisonment. Instead of pursuing the matter in state court, the
parties brought a section 1983 action in the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York' 0 to restrain the contempt cita-
tions, asserting that the underlying state provisions violated procedural
due process."I The state, however, urged the district court to abstain out
of respect for the integrity of the state judicial process.12 In rejecting the
state's argument, the district court held that intervention is appropriate
when the statutes in question permit incarceration without a preliminary
hearing and when they cannot be construed in any manner which would
avoid constitutional challenges. 13 The court then enjoined the challenged
state provisions insofar as they permitted incarceration and punitive
of appellee Harry Vail was typical of the cases of other judgment debtors under the
challenged statutes. Vail v. Quinlan, 406 F. Supp. 951, 956 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). Vail and his
wife were indigents who owed $534.63 on a loan from the Public Loan Company. The loan
company filed suit in county court seeking payment and was awarded a default judgment
when Vail did not respond to the summons or complaint. Shortly thereafter, Vail was
served with a subpoena, requiring satisfaction of the judgment. Again, Vail did not
appear. On an affidavit and motion filed by the loan company, Judge Joseph Juidice of the
county court issued a show cause order requiring Vail's presence at a scheduled hearing.
Three weeks later, after Vail had failed to respond to the order or appear at the hearing,
Judge Juidice issued an "Order Imposing Fine" which held Vail in civil contempt and
required him to pay $270 to the loan company. Six weeks later, when Vail had still not
complied with the order, the loan company applied for and obtained an ex parte commit-
ment order which resulted in Vail's arrest. Id. at 956-57.
9. See N.Y. JUD. LAW §§ 750-781 (McKinney 1968). Section 756 provides for the
issuance of a warrant to commit a judgment debtor without warning. Section 757 allows a
state judge to issue a discretionary show cause order or attachment warrant. Section 770
authorizes the imposition of punishment. Sections 773 and 774 provide for fines and
imprisonment, respectively.
10. 406 F. Supp. at 953. A three-judge court was convened pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2281 (1970)(repealed 1976), which required that injunctions staying the enforcement of
state statutes only be issued by "a district court of three judges."
11. The fourteenth amendment provides that no person shall be deprived of "life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The
appellees alleged that the statutory scheme permitted adjudication of contempt and an
order of imprisonment without an actual hearing, failed to provide adequate notice or
warning of the consequences of failure to appear at the show cause hearing, subjected the
debtor to imprisonment without informing him of his right to counsel, and permitted
punitive fines and imprisonment. 406 F. Supp. at 959.
12. The state contended that federal intervention was inappropriate since state pro-
ceedings were pending and the state had not been afforded an opportunity to construe the
challenged provisions. Id. at 957.
13. Id. at 957-59.
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fines without providing for adequate notice, hearing or assistance of
counsel. 14
On direct appeal, 5 the Supreme Court reversed this decision, ruling
that federal intervention is improper when the litigant has an adequate
state remedy and fails to establish bad faith harassment by the state
officials enforcing the challenged statute. 16 Writing for the majority,
Justice Rehnquist reasoned that the state's interests in the integrity of its
contempt proceedings were sufficiently significant to prohibit interven-
tion, notwithstanding the federal claims raised by the judgment debt-
ors.' 7 Justice Brennan, in dissent, sharply disagreed, arguing that section
1983 manifested congressional intent to establish the federal courts as
the primary forum for the litigation of federal constitutional rights re-
gardless of the pendency of state civil proceedings.' 8
14. Id. at 959-60. The court held that the state contempt provisions violated procedural
due process because: (1) they permitted imprisonment based solely upon an ex parte
proceeding; (2) the notice provided for by the statutes failed to "contain a clear statement
of the purpose of the hearing and a stark warning that failure to appear may result in
contempt of court and imprisonment;" (3) the statutes failed to provide for notice of the
debtor's right to counsel; and (4) the statutes allowed punitive fines without "the pro-
cedural safeguards of indictment and jury trial."
15. The appeal was taken in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (1970), which provides
for direct appeal to the Supreme Court of all orders granting injunctions in civil actions
"required by any Act of Congress to be heard and determined by a district court of three
judges."
16. 430 U.S. at 337-38. The Supreme Court also held that only two of the named
appellees, Patrick Ward and Joseph Rabasco, had the requisite standing to challenge the
contempt citations because, at the time the challenges were initiated, all named appellees
except Ward and Rabasco had been released from prison and "no longer had a live
controversy with appellants or other New York State officials .... " Id. at 332-33 (citing
Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 434-35 (1975) and Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459
n. 10 (1974), both cases held that a genuine threat of prosecution or other live controversy
must be shown at each stage of the litigation). Cf. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372
(1976) (citizens lack standing to challenge police department procedures when their claim
of injury rests not upon what the police department will do to them, but what an unnamed
minority of policemen might do).
17. 430 U.S. at 335-37. See text accompanying notes 49-58 infra.
18. Id. at 342. (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan ob-
served that:
Congress created [§ 1983] over a century ago, and at the same time expressly
charged the federal judicial system with responsibility for the vindication and
enforcement of federal rights under it against unconstitutional action under color
of state law 'whether that action be executive, legislative, or judicial,' Mitchum
v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 240 (1972) (emphasis in original). In congressional
contemplation, the pendency of state civil proceedings was to be wholly irrele-
vant.
Id. See text accompanying notes 59-67 infra for a discussion of the dissent.
Justices Stevens and Stewart also viewed abstention as inappropriate under the circum-
stances. Id. at 341, 348. Justice Stevens, although concurring in the judgment, disputed
the majority's belief that the New York state courts provided adequate litigational forums,
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I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN ABSTENTION DOCTRINE
Abstention can best be characterized as a judicial doctrine which seeks
to avoid conflicts between state and federal courts in areas of overlap-
ping jurisdiction.' 9 Originally, abstention was invoked by the federal
courts to avoid review of state statutes by providing state courts with an
opportunity to interpret their challenged laws first.2" But within the last
decade the Supreme Court has developed a new variety of abstention,
much more fundamental in nature, which requires federal courts to
abstain completely in all cases in which intervention would threaten
important state interests.2" Since the Supreme Court has recognized that
the states' interests in their criminal processes are paramount, applica-
tion of the modern abstention doctrine has been concentrated in the area
of criminal litigation. 22
In Younger v. Harris,23 the Supreme Court enunciated the rule to be
followed by federal courts when asked to intervene in state proceedings,
holding that courts should abstain in all such cases except for those in
which a state statute is facially challenged on constitutional grounds and
observing that "[ilf, as appellees' contend, [the challenged statutes] violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, they cannot provide an adequate remedy
for appellees' federal claim." Id. at 340 & n.3 (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 108
n.9 (1975)). For a discussion of Gerstein, see text accompanying notes 33-35 infra. In his
dissent, Justice Stewart would resolve the competing interests with a temporary absten-
tion by the federal court pending an authoritative state court construction of the challeng-
ed statutes. 430 U.S. at 347 (citing Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)).
For a discussion of Pullman, see note 20 & accompanying text infra.
19. See England v. Louisiana Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964), in which
the Supreme Court characterized abstention as "a judge-fashioned vehicle for according
appropriate deference to the 'respective competence of the state and federal court sys-
tems' " (quoting Louisiana v. P. & L. Co. v. Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959)).
20. See Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 4% (1941). The federal plaintiffs in
Pullman challenged a rule promulgated by the state railroad commission which dis-
criminated against black railroad employees by requiring that conductors (always white)
rather than porters (always black) be in charge of railroad cars. The plaintiffs did not
challenge the rule as provided for by the state enabling act but sought a federal injunction
instead. The district court granted the injunction, but the Supreme Court reversed,
holding that it was an abuse of discretion for the district court to intervene without giving
the state an adequate opportunity to construe the regulation in question. Id. at 501. One of
the most important aspects of this decision was the fact that the Court expressly permitted
the state litigant to return to federal court if the state court failed to resolve the constitu-
tional issues. Id. See generally Field, Abstention in Constitutional Cases: The Scope of the
Pullman Abstention Doctrine, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1071 (1974).
21. This doctrine has been termed "Younger" abstention. See Younger v. Harris, 401
U.S. 37 (1971). Under Younger abstention, the federal power to review alleged state
violations of individual constitutional rights was substantially curtailed. See notes 23-31 &
accompanying text infra.
22. See Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 604-05 (1975).
23. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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bad faith is established on the part of the state in enforcing the statute. 24
In so ruling, the Court effectively overruled its earlier decision in Dom-
browski v. Pfister25 in which it held that either a first amendment facial
challenge or a showing of bad faith would warrant federal intervention. 26
The plaintiffs in Younger had invoked section 1983 to challenge pending
prosecutions brought by the state of California under its antisubversive
statute. 27 A three-judge district court enjoined the state prosecutions
relying solely upon the fact that, on their face, the challenged statutes
violated first amendment guarantees. 28 Because the lower court con-
cluded that facial invalidity was sufficient to permit intervention, it did
24. Id. at 54. The Supreme Court stated "that the possible unconstitutionality of a
statute ' on its face' does not in itself justify an injunction against good-faith attempts to
enforce it." Id. This decision was essentially based on two principles: that of equity
jurisprudence prohibiting interference with criminal proceedings when the litigant has an
adequate remedy at law, and the somewhat more abstract tenets of comity and federalism
implying judicial restraint when legitimate state interests may be affected. Id. at 43-44.
The Court also stated, however, that there might be cases so extraordinary that they
would permit intervention even if the state were acting in good faith. Id. at 54. In the
seven years since the Court's ruling in Younger, however, no such case has come to light.
It has been suggested that intervention is appropriate under Younger when prosecution is
threatened under more than one statute, but brought only under one; when actual police
behavior suggests harassment; and when the police make arrests, but release the defend-
ants prior to trial. In all these instances, the forum state would be precluded from
affording adequate review of state laws and actions and would be acting in bad faith. See
The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 38, 314-15 (1971).
25. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
26. Id. at 489-90. Dombrowski involved a first amendment challenge to two Louisiana
subversive control statutes, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 14:358-74, 390-90.08 (Cum. Supp. 1962),
invoked by the state in an effort to discourage civil rights activities. These statutes
restricted protests against state laws and actions. The plaintiffs, representatives of an
organization active in promoting the civil rights of blacks in Louisiana, sued in federal
district court under § 1983, seeking to restrain any pending or threatened prosecutions
under these statutes. The district court denied the requested relief on the ground that
federal equity powers should not be employed to interfere with ongoing state criminal
prosecutions. 227 F. Supp. 556, 563-64 (E.D. La. 1964). On appeal, Justice Bennan,
writing for the majority, ruled that intervention was appropriate when the state statutes at
issue were justifiably challenged as facially abridging first amendment guarantees or were
applied in bad faith to discourage parties from freely exercising their constitutional rights.
380 U.S. 479, 489-90 (1965). Since Justice Brennan found both the abridgement of first
amendment rights and bad faith enforcement by the state, the Younger Court was able to
characterize his disjunctive ruling as dicta and replace it with a ruling requiring a litigant to
establish both unconstitutional abridgement and bad faith. 401 U.S. at 48-49. In so doing,
it appears that the Younger Court effectively overruled Justice Brennan's disjunctive test
for intervention, and, therefore, rendered Dombrowski significant for historical purposes
only.
27. The California Criminal Syndicalism Act, CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11400-02 (1968).
The Act sought to control the organization and activities of subversive groups in
California.
28. 281 F. Supp. 507, 516 (C.D. Cal. 1968). The district court construed Dombrowski as




not rule on the question of whether the statutes had been invoked in bad
faith. 29 The state appealed the district court judgment directly to the
Supreme Court and won a reversal. Not only did the Supreme Court rule
that both a facial challenge to the statutes and a showing of bad faith
enforcement are necessary to permit intervention, but the Court also
reached the factual conclusion that California was enforcing its statutes
in good faith and not in an attempt to harass the federal plaintiffs. 3°
Therefore, the Court dissolved the district court injunction and dis-
missed the suit.3 1
In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court has retreated from this
absolute position by loosening the requirements for intervention in two
ways. First, the Court held that the conjunctive test enunciated in Youn-
ger applies only to pending state proceedings. 32 Second, the Court ruled
that abstention is not required when the federal litigant lacks sufficient
opportunity to fairly adjudicate all of his federal claims in state court.
This latter rationale is exemplified by the Supreme Court's decision in
Gerstein v. Pugh .33 In that case, the Court permitted intervention in a
state criminal prosecution in which the state defendants were detained
without a judicial determination that probable cause existed for their
arrest. The state proceeding in question failed to provide for challenges
to the detention procedures.' Therefore, the Court concluded that the
defendant had not been afforded an adequate state remedy and was thus
entitled to federal injunctive relief. 35
29. Id. at 517. For a discussion of the requisites of establishing bad faith enforcement,
see note 49 infra.
30. See 401 U.S. at 54. The Court merely stated that the appellees had failed to show
bad faith on the part of the state. There was no analysis of the facts or inferences which
led the Court to reach that conclusion.
31. Id. Interestingly, Justice Brennan wrote a short concurrence in which he simply
stated that abstention was proper under the circumstances. Id. at 56-58. See note 65 &
accompanying text infra.
32. See Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). Steffel did not involve a request for
injunctive relief, but a request for declaratory relief. The Court ruled that if no state
proceedings were pending, the federal court could intervene. The following term, the
Court clarified this with respect to injunctions by holding that federal intervention was
proper only when actual proceedings of substance were held in the federal forum prior to
the filing of the state claims. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
33. 420 U.S. 103 (1975).
34. See FLA. RULES CRIM. PRo. chs. 901-45, which set out numerous defenses which
may be asserted in a criminal case, none of which relate to challenging the detention
procedures.
35. 420 U.S. at 108 n.9. Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564 (1973), represents another
example of permissible intervention when the state forum is inadequate. In that case the
Court held intervention appropriate because the state board adjudicating the federal
claims was biased against the federal litigant since members of the forum stood to profit
by their decision. Id. at 578-79.
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Both Younger and Gerstein involved federal challenges to state crim-
inal proceedings. Nevertheless, the Supreme court had implied that the
same logical underpinnings of Younger and the gloss added subsequently
by Gerstein could be applied to civil litigation. 36 Indeed, in Huffman v.
Pursue, Ltd., 3 the Supreme Court did apply the Younger principles to a
state civil proceeding and concluded that abstention was proper. In
Huffman, the state of Ohio brought an action under its civil nuisance
statutes 38 against the proprietor of a pornographic movie theater. The
state could easily have brought the action under its criminal nuisance
statutes39 instead, but chose not to do so. Moreover, since the civil and
criminal nuisance statutes were highly integrated, employing many of the
same procedures and requiring much of the same proof, the threat to the
state's interests posed by federal intervention did not vary because the
civil rather than the criminal nuisance statutes were invoked. 40 At least
Justice Rehnquist saw little difference. He held that abstention was
justified in accordance with the Younger doctrine because the nuisance
action was "more akin to a criminal prosecution than are most civil
cases." 41 Once again the Supreme Court dissolved a district court injunc-
tion on the ground that federal intervention would pose a greater harm to
the judicial system than would state adjudication of federal constitution-
al issues.42 Because of the similarity between the state criminal and civil
statutes, the Court's decision in Huffman did not, by itself, portend great
expansion of Younger into civil litigation. Nonetheless, by focusing on
the substantiality of the state's interest in its proceedings, instead of the
36. At least three federal courts of appeals took the lead and applied Younger to civil
proceedings. See Duke v. Texas, 477 F.2d 244, 248 (5th Cir. 1973); Lynch v. Snepp, 472
F.2d 769, 773 (4th Cir. 1973); Cousins v. Wigoda, 463 F.2d 603, 606-07 (7th Cir. 1972). All
three cases involved first amendment challenges to state court proceedings and orders
brought to restrict the rights of various organizations seeking to demonstrate against state
policies.
37. 420 U.S. 592 (1975).
38. OHto REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3767.01-.99 (1971), which provide that a place exhibiting
obscene films constitutes a nuisance and may be ordered closed for up to one year.
39. OHio REv. CODE ANN. §§ 2907.01, .31-.37 (1975), which provide for criminal
penalties in addition to closure.
40. One example of this integration is that the definitions of such terms as "obscenity"
needed to invoke the civil nuisance statute were based on those contained in Ohio's
criminal nuisance statutes. See State ex rel. Keating v. Vixen, 27 Ohio St. 2d 278, 272
N.E.2d 137 (1971), rehearing denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1975).
41. 420 U.S. at 604. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Douglas, dissent-
ed. Justice Brennan distinguished criminal and civil cases on the fact that a civil defendant
is not protected by the requirements of indictment and a finding of probable cause. Id. at
615. He presented substantially the same arguments regarding the impact of § 1983 on the
federal structure as he advanced in his Juidice dissent. See text accompanying notes 61-66
infra.
42. Id. at 612-13.
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equity interests traditionally invoked to support abstention in criminal
cases, 43 the Court signaled the possible future expansion of the Younger
doctrine to all civil cases. 44
II. JUIDICE V. VAIL: MOVING TOWARD THE EXTREMES
Juidice v. Vail, like all other abstention cases, involved two conflicting
interests: the state's in maintaining the integrity of its judicial proceed-
ings, and the federal government's in insuring individual constitutional
rights. The central differences that surfaced between the majority and
the major dissent were a function of the relative weight each accorded
these interests. Unfortunately, instead of balancing the differing state
and federal concerns, each opted for an extreme. The majority, repre-
sented by Justice Rehnquist, supported the authority of state govern-
ments and demanded federal abstention, 45 while Justice Brennan in his
dissent favored the federal government and demanded federal interven-
tion. Interestingly, both Justices supported their respective positions by
embracing the abstract concept of federalism. But since neither gave due
consideration to the opposing position, their opinions suffer from a
fundamental shallowness in both logic and legal theory.
46
Justice Rehnquist defined the notion of comity as the proper respect
for state functions, recognizing that government will be most effective if
the states and their institutions are free to perform their independent
functions in their own ways. 47 Although superficially compelling, this
definition may be misleading when the issue concerns individual rights
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. In such a situation, the respec-
tive concerns of state and federal courts cannot be separate, but must be
43. Id. at 604-09. Justice Rehnquist reversed the importance of the considerations cited
by the Court in Younger. See notes 56-58 & accompanying text infra.
44. After Huffman, the number of federal courts which chose to abstain when request-
ed to intervene in state civil proceedings increased substantially. See, e.g., Forest Hills
Util. Co. v. City of Heath, 539 F.2d 592 (6th Cir. 1976) (condemnation); ACLU v.
Bozardt, 539 F.2d 340 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 1022 (1976) (attorney discipline).
But see Sartin v. Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 535 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1976) (driver's license,
and noting that Huffman does not apply to claims for damages).
45. Justice Rehnquist made the expected disclaimer that the scope of his opinion did
not include all civil litigation. 430 U.S. at 336 n. 13. Nevertheless, by gauging the propriety
of intervention by the substantiality of the state's interests and ignoring the federal
interests, he has effectively expanded the abstention doctrine far into the civil realm. See
text accompanying notes 49-55 infra.
46. The only Justice who appeared to balance both of the competing federal and state
interests was Justice Stewart. See note 18 supra. The procedure adopted by the Supreme
Court in Pullman appears to effectively balance these interests by providing the state with
an initial opportunity to resolve the constitutional issues, but permitting the federal court
to retain jurisdiction should the state's resolution fail to be adequate. See note 20 supra.
47. 430 U.S. at 334 (quoting Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 44).
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identical. Each must logically strive to insure that individual rights are
protected from governmental infringement. 48 To take the position that
federal courts have little, if any, role in this process is to distort the true
meaning of the federal system. The main question to be answered,
therefore, is how far Justice Rehnquist would go in prohibiting federal
courts from intervening in state proceedings for the protection of these
rights. The answer, unfortunately, appears to be too far.
Under his view, a federal court would be effectively prohibited from
intervening except when the state proceedings are brought in bad faith 49
or fail to provide an adequate opportunity for the litigation of the federal
claims. 50 Even under these circumstances, however, it would appear that
Justice Rehnquist would be hesitant to permit intervention. For instance,
in Juidice, the sole state remedy available to the appellees was not
available until after the imposition of fines or imprisonment.5  Further-
more, in order for the appellees to have pursued their challenge to the
contempt provisions in state court, they would have been forced to rely
upon the same provisions to gain jurisdiction for their challenge. Recog-
nizing this dilemma, the district court applied Gerstein v. Pugh, which it
interpreted as permitting intervention when the constitutional challenge
is directed not against the criminal prosecution, but against incarceration
without a preliminary hearing 2.5 Justice Rehnquist disagreed, and distin-
guished Gerstein by finding that the appellees in Juidice had an opportu-
nity to present their federal claims in the state proceeding.5 Signifi-
48. By placing the emphasis on the propriety of litigating in federal versus state courts,
both Justices Rehnquist and Brennan place the choice of forum over the substance of the
litigation. The major concern should be vindication of individual rights, not the propriety
of a particular forum. See also notes 59-66 & accompanying text infra.
49. See 430 U.S. at 338. Under the Younger conjunctive test, a party must prove both
facial abridgement and bad faith enforcement. Since, in § 1983 actions, facial abridgement
is almost always established, bad faith becomes the crucial issue. For this reason, it shall
be assumed, When discussing the bad faith exception, that facial abridgement has been
established. Justice Rehnquist limited the bad faith exception by observing that it "may
not be utilized unless it is alleged and proved that [the state officials] are enforcing the
contempt procedures in bad faith or are motivated by a desire to harass." Id. This
exception which encompasses the bad faith and constitutional infringement requirements
of Younger can be traced to the equity considerations cited by the Younger Court. Under
equity principles, intervention is appropriate to prevent irreparable injury to the parties.
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. at 43-44.
50. See 430 U.S. at 337. This exception can also be traced to the equity component
underlying the Court's decision in Younger. 401 U.S. at 43. In fact, it was the failure of
the state forum to provide adequate review of the constitutional claims in Gerstein which
led to the Court's permitting intervention in that instance. 420 U.S. at 107-08 & n.9. See
notes 34-35 supra.
51. See 406 F. Supp. at 958.
52. Id. at 957-59.
53. See 430 U.S. at 337. Justice Rehnquist went on to conclude that "[n]o more is
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cantly, he arrived at this conclusion despite the fact that this opportunity
Rehnquist relied on both these considerations to support his abstention
ruling, but reversed their significance.5 7 Finally, in Juidice, Justice Rehn-
quist took this process one step further and deleted the equity con-
sideration completely.58 In so doing he has taken the Court from a
moderate resolution of the conflicting federal and state interests to an
extreme.
At the other extreme is the dissenting opinion of Justice Brennan.
Under his view with respect to civil proceedings, section 1983 was
would not arise until after the imposition of the state sanctions. Under
this analysis, it would appear that any opportunity for state litigation of
the federal issue, no matter how remote, is sufficient to invoke Younger
abstention.5 4 Thus, the only practical avenue to a federal court for the
state litigant is a showing of bad faith by the state in enforcing the
challenged statute. Regretfully, this requirement also appears to be dif-
ficult for a party to fulfill since it requires the showing of a specific intent
to harass one who is exercising his constitutional rights. Except in
extreme circumstances, it would seem all but impossible to determine
whether the state is harassing an individual or merely enforcing the law. 55
Beyond the theoretical difficulties in accepting Justice Rehnquist's
analysis there are legal dilemmas as well. The majority opinion does not
clearly comport with the Supreme Court's decision in Younger. As
noted, the Court in Younger ruled that intervention in criminal proceed-
ings is inappropriate because it violates the principles of comity and
equity jurisprudence. Of these two principles, the Younger Court ap-
peared to place primary emphasis on equity. 56 In Huffman, Justice
required to invoke Younger abstention." Id. (citing Gibson v. Berryhill, 411 U.S. 564, 557
(1973)) (principles of abstention apply when state litigants are accorded an opportunity to
fairly pursue their constitutional claims in the ongoing state proceeding). 430 U.S. at 337.
54. In contrast, Justice Stevens recognized the inadequacy of the state remedy in
Juidice and would have permitted intervention. 1d. at 339-41.
55. This conclusion is supported by Justice Rehnquist's test for finding bad faith. See
note 49 supra.
56. In Younger, the Court stated that:
The precise reasons for this longstanding public policy against federal court
interference with state court proceedings have never been specifically identified
but the primary sources of the policy are plain. One is the basic doctrine of equity
jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act, and particularly should not act
to restrain a criminal prosecution, when the moving party has an adequate
remedy at law and will not suffer irreparable injury if denied equitable relief.
401 U.S. at 43-44.
57. 420 U.S. at 603-05.
58. In failing to even mention the equity considerations underlying the Court's decision
in Younger, Justice Rehnquist placed total reliance upon the considerations of comity and
federalism. 430 U.S. at 334.
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enacted "for the express purpose of altering the federal-state judicial
balance" 59 which existed prior to its inception so as to offer" 'a uniquely
federal remedy against incursions under the claimed authority of state
law .... ",,60 upon individual rights guaranteed by the Federal Consti-
tution. A necessary corollary of this perspective, however, would be that
in this same statute Congress intended to relegate state courts to a
secondary and greatly inferior role within our two-court system when
federal rights are at issue. 61 This position assumes that the federal courts
are peculiarly able to protect individual rights guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution. In some instances, especially in cases involving minority
group rights, this federal court sensitivity has proven to be fairly accu-
rate. 62 Nonetheless, as an absolute rule, it lacks a sufficient basis in
either logic or experience. Both federal and state courts must be cogni-
zant of the practical considerations which may require a certain degree
of infringement upon a particular individual's rights. 63 There is no assur-
ance that federal courts will bend less to the demands of public policy
considerations or the demands of a full docket than will state courts.
Instead, an absolute right to go to federal court for injunctive relief
59. Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 456 (1977) (Brennan, J., joined by Marshall,
J., dissenting). Trainor, decided two weeks after Juidice, involved a state garnishment
proceeding. Relying on Younger, Huffman, and Juidice, the Supreme Court held that the
state's interest in its garnishment proceedings was substantial enough to warrant federal
abstention. Id. at 444-47.
60. See 430 U.S. at 342 (quoting Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 239 (1972)). Justice
Brennan stated that:
Rather than furthering principles of comity and our federalism, forced federal
abdication . . . undercuts one of the chief values of federalism-the protection
and vindication of important and overriding federal civil rights, which Congress,
in § 1983 and the Judiciary Act of 1875, ordained should be a primary responsibili-
ty of the federal courts.
Id. at 343-44.
61. Justice Brennan's position would also appear to allow a defendant in state court to
go to federal court and seek restraint of any state proceeding at any stage so long as
federal questions are involved. This liberal access approach would clearly result in
substantial disruption of the state judicial process.
62. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1966) (invalidating state statute prohibit-
ing interracial marriage); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1954) (requiring
desegregation of state school systems).
63. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 46-51 (1961), in which the
Court held that a state may bar a lawyer from practice for refusing to answer questions
about his subversive activities without violating his first amendment rights. Speaking for
the Court, Justice Harlan stated that whenever first amendment "protections are asserted
against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation must be effected, and




would significantly increase the burden on the already overloaded feder-
al courts.64
Even assuming that Justice Brennan's view on federal intervention in
civil proceedings is a proper interpretation of the scope of section 1983,
his view, nevertheless, is inconsistent with his earlier position with
respect to federal intervention in state criminal proceedings. In his con-
curring opinion in Younger, Justice Brennan stated that, absent bad
faith, intervention in a state criminal proceeding was improper when the
litigant's "constitutional contentions may be adequately adjudicated in
the state criminal proceeding." 65 However, section 1983 makes no dis-
tinction between criminal and civil proceedings and addresses all depri-
vations of individual rights under color of state law.' Therefore, it is
inconsistent for Justice Brennan to develop a virtually absolute rule for
intervention in civil proceedings and concomitantly deny that this rule
carries over to any degree in the area of criminal litigation. 67
CONCLUSION
In Juidice v. Vail, the Supreme Court effectively limited federal inter-
vention to instances in which either the state forum fails to provide an
adequate remedy or the challenged state action is brought in bad faith.
One must wonder, however, whether this decision embodies a satisfac-
tory resolution of the competing interests underlying federal abstention.
The major problem with respect to the opinions of Justices Rehnquist
and Brennan in Juidice is the fact that each adheres to one of the two
competing interests within our dual court system and proceeds from
there to an inflexible conclusion. This process distorts the salient inter-
ests which must be considered when determining whether or not a
federal court should intervene in a state court proceeding. A more
appropriate test would be for the Court to weigh the relative values of
64. An absolute right for a state litigant to go to federal court for relief from a state
proceeding whenever Federal Constitutional rights are at issue would upset the federal-
state judicial balance in two ways. First, as a practical matter, it would postpone state
court judgments until the entire federal appeals process had been exhausted. Second, it
would greatly increase the load on the federal courts. These two effects are interrelated
since by overloading the federal court dockets, Justice Brennan's position would also
substantially increase the time for final adjudication of federal rights. Therefore, an
absolute right to federal review could unconscionably postpone the finality of most state
litigation involving federal issues.
65. 401 U.S. at 56-57.
66. See note I supra.
67. It has been asserted that Justice Brennan's opinions in Younger and Huffman (and
therefore Juidice) are irreconcilable. See The Supreme Court, 1974 Term, supra note 5, at
156-58. See also note 31 supra.
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each of these interests in the context in which they are presented and
determine whether, in that instance, federalism will best be served by
abstention or intervention. i
Unfortunately, regardless of the propriety of Justice Rehnquist's ex-
pansion of Younger abstention, it is a majority view and presently the
law on the subject. Until it is overruled or modified, Juidice will result in
the continued closing of the federal courts to state litigants. It should be
remembered, however, that in Juidice the Court was divided five-to-four
over the propriety of intervention. Therefore, should a single Justice
reevaluate his position or should a new Justice be appointed to the Court
with views differing from those of his predecessor, the expanding trend of
the abstention doctrine may be reversed. In any case, the area of federal
intervention is much too volatile for anyone to assume that the breadth
of abstention in Justice Rehnquist's ruling in Juidice may not later be
narrowed.
Robert B. Ott
